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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Herring v. United
States,' which expanded the "good faith" exception to the exclusion-
ary rule, has caused much concern among American legal scholars.
Many fear that Herring might be "a mere harbinger of things to
come."3 They have pointed to its dangerous potential of transforming
the exclusionary rule, making exclusion the exception rather than the
2. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
3. Wayne R. LeFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest As-
sault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. oF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 787 (2009).
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rule.4 Following Justice Ginsburg's lead, some have expressed con-
cern that Herring's approach towards exclusion will increasingly leave
violations of the Fourth Amendment without remedy;5 this, in turn,
will significantly weaken rights.6 Herring's transformative power of
course largely depends on how broadly or narrowly it will be con-
strued.7 Many of the concerns may be overstated. Still, even taking a
cautious approach, Herring appears to be yet another chapter in the
Supreme Court's chipping away at the exclusionary rule.'
Part of the criticism of Herring was aimed at the Court's holding
that "the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs... of letting
guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free,"9 and that deter-
rence must "pay its way." Such language seems to imply that the ex-
clusionary rule might increasingly take the form of a case-by-case
balancing test, which will weigh the benefits of deterrence against the
costs of exclusion and possible acquittal.
If critics are right, and American law is in fact headed towards
adopting a more flexible exclusionary standard, it is crucial to consider
the experience of other countries that have taken that approach.
Flexible exclusionary standards, based on elaborate weighing tests,
are quite prevalent among other legal systems. Therefore, their expe-
rience may provide useful insight, but also important warnings about
the dangers of shifting towards a more flexible exclusionary standard.
To shed light on that issue, this article explores recent developments
in Israeli exclusionary rule jurisprudence and how they have impacted
judicial practices.
In May 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court handed down its much
anticipated ruling in Issacharov v. The Chief Military Prosecutor,10
redefining the Court's position towards unlawfully obtained evidence.
Whereas in the past Israeli courts would not exclude illegally acquired
4. See Allan Matthew Josephson, To Exclude or Not To Exclude: The Future of the Exclu-
sionary Rule After Herring v. United States, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 175, 177 (2009).
5. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. See David B. Owens, Comment, Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibration: A Com-
ment on Herring v. United States and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 574-75 (2010).
7. Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85
CHi-KENT L. REV. 191, 204 (2010).
8. For a discussion of the erosion of the exclusionary rule under the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts see Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996).
9. Herring v. U.S, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009).
10. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] IsrSC 2006(1), reprinted
in 2006(1) Isr. L. Rep. 320, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng98/ 2 10/O51./n 2 l/
98051210.n21.pdf.
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evidence unless also deemed unreliable,11 the new doctrine empow-
ered courts to disregard such evidence altogether, reliable as it may
be. Still, exclusion would in no case be automatic, even if the most
fundamental of the defendants' rights were severely and intentionally
violated. Under Issacharov, judges were to have broad discretion over
exclusion. They were to rule on a case-by-case basis, taking into ac-
count the totality of the circumstances. To that end, Issacharov pro-
vided a long illustrative list of potentially relevant considerations.12
According to the Supreme Court, Issacharov was not an isolated
decision. The Justices explained that their ruling reflected a broader
transformation in Israel's normative landscape, which began in 1992
with the passing of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.13 This
"Constitutional Revolution" as the Court has dubbed it,' 4 had intro-
duced greater protection for human rights, including those of criminal
defendants. Courts would now give such rights greater consideration
when they collided with other rights, values, and interests such as
crime control and verdict accuracy. Whereas in the past rectitude of
decision reigned supreme as the primary objective of Israeli evidence
law,' 5 "doing justice" would henceforth require greater attention to
trial fairness and due process.' 6
In previous work I have argued that Issacharov's main signifi-
cance was rhetorical: it was meant to proclaim the Israeli Supreme
Court's liberal values and signal its affiliation with other common law
jurisdictions. I explained that from a practical perspective the deci-
sion's significance was limited. 7 Still, I wondered what effect Is-
11. Courts could only diminish the evidence's weight. Id. 48, at 377-79.
12. See id. $ 76, at 429.
13. Id. 54, at 402.
14. Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the
Basic Laws and its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law, 31 ISR. L. REV. 3 (1997).
15. Id. [ 40, at 379-81. The Court emphasized that rectitude of decision would continue to
be the primary goal of the criminal legal process, but due process would now play a greater role.
See id. 47, at 390-92. The Court also emphasized that rectitude of decision was never the sole
objective of the rules of evidence and of the criminal process. Other aims are reflected in the
various privileges recognized under Israeli law and in the Meiri doctrine, that allowed courts to
discount the weight given to unlawfully obtained evidence. See id. 44, at 379-81, 383-85. The
Court also emphasized legislation that excludes evidence obtained in breach of privacy or
through illegal wiretapping. Id. $ 39, at 376-79.
16. See id. 45, at 385-88. "A broader conception of dispensing justice is not restricted to
uncovering the truth and accurately applying the law to the facts of a given case; the administra-
tion of justice is also dependant on the way in which the court reaches its decision in the circum-
stances of the case before it." Id. 45, at 387.
17. See Binyamin Blum, Note, Doctrines Without Borders: The "New" Israeli Exclusionary
Rule and the Dangers of Legal Transplantation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2131, 2139 (2008). I argued that
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sacharov's rhetoric might have on Israeli courts' exclusionary
practices.
This article is designed to answer that question. My purpose is to
examine the extent to which Israeli courts have delivered on Is-
sacharov's rhetorical promise to take defendants' rights more seri-
ously. Has Issacharov indeed been a watershed, representing a
paradigm shift in the way that Israeli courts consider unlawful police
behavior and the evidence it yields? Or has the stated shift been pri-
marily rhetorical? To answer these questions, I take a close and criti-
cal look at the decisions rendered in motions to exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence during the three and a half years since Issacharov.
Qualitatively analyzing a dataset of 126 decisions, I examine how the
judiciary-both lower courts and the Supreme Court itself-has inter-
preted and applied Issacharov. I examine how courts have balanced
the defendants' right to due process with other competing interests
and values. In an effort to identify what judges deem determining
factors when applying the exclusionary rule, I compare and contrast
the cases in which courts have excluded unlawfully obtained evidence
and those in which they have not.
I argue that in practice, judicial responsiveness to Issacharov has
been rather limited. Regardless of the rights infringed, Israeli courts
have been loath to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Proof of guilt
is rarely suppressed, even in relatively minor charges. Successful mo-
tions to exclude can generally be traced to a small group of judges
who have seized on Issacharov's rhetoric to further defendants' rights.
However, the vast majority of judges in Israel avoid exclusion, draw-
ing on the highly flexible and ambiguous doctrine provided in Is-
sacharov to justify their rulings.
I do not, however, consider Issacharov's flexibility and internal
inconsistencies to be the cause of the exclusionary rule's demise in
Israel. Rather, I argue that Issacharov as well as subsequent cases are
the effects of broader socio-legal phenomena. While other scholars
have drawn attention to Issacharov's many doctrinal shortcomings, my
dataset demonstrates that in an effort to eschew the exclusionary rule
and admit unlawfully obtained evidence, lower courts have gone be-
yond the bounds of the doctrine as laid down by the Supreme Court
and have proven quite resourceful in avoiding exclusion.
Therefore I suggest a different explanation for the exclusionary
rule's failure in Israel. Drawing on Mirjan Damagka's scholarship on
from a practical standpoint, deeming evidence "admissible, but without weight" was equivalent
to adopting a flexible exclusionary rule.
2010]
390 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
comparative legal process,' 8 I argue that Issacharov and its progeny
reflect a particular approach towards justice that prevails in Israeli le-
gal culture. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's rhetoric, Israeli
courts remain far more outcome driven, rather than process oriented.
If a result is regarded by a court to be accurate it is therefore also
considered just, regardless of the procedural flaws in arriving at that
outcome. This result-driven approach has proved resilient even after
the Constitutional Revolution, and in fact seems only to be gaining
ground, in criminal procedure and beyond.
Furthermore, I argue that concepts and doctrines originating in
administrative law, such as reasonableness, proportionality, presump-
tions of regularity, inherent powers and "relative voidness," have all
found their way into the application of the exclusionary rule. In an
attempt to explain how and why these doctrines have crept into the
criminal legal system, I suggest that counterterrorism might provide at
least a partial explanation: efforts to try terrorists in civilian courts
may have opened the gates to incorporating administrative law stan-
dards into criminal procedure. The desire to afford a fair criminal
trial, coupled with the fear of setting potentially dangerous terrorists
free, has deemed criminal procedure more pliable. The flexibility that
such trials have introduced often goes well beyond cases of national
security, influencing standard criminal proceedings as well.
The article is divided into three parts. I begin by exploring the
Supreme Court's ruling in Issacharov and the exclusionary rule it cre-
ated. I then consider some of the doctrinal critiques Israeli legal
scholars have raised against the decision. In the second part I turn my
attention to the empirical component and examine how courts have
applied Issacharov. In the final section I consider some of the under-
lying causes for judicial reticence to exclude unlawfully obtained evi-
dence despite the high and promising rhetoric of Issacharov.
II. THE ISSACHAROV RULING
A. The Facts and the Holding
On May 4, 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Issacharov v. The Chief Military Prosecutor,19 awarding courts
the discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence.2 1 Upon admis-
sion to a military prison to serve a sentence for absence without leave,
18. See generally MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORrrY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 148 (1986).
19. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov [2006].
20. Id. 1 76, at 429.
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Rafael Issacharov, a private in the Israeli Defense Forces, was caught
with cannabis on his person. The small packet of marijuana had
dropped from his underwear while the defendant was being strip-
searched." Issacharov responded immediately: "it's weed; I can ex-
plain.12 2 The following day, Issacharov was interrogated by the mili-
tary police who informed him of his right to remain silent, but
knowingly and intentionally refrained from informing him that he was
under arrest or of his right to an attorney.23 Issacharov subsequently
confessed to prior possession and use of marijuana and provided the
military police with a urine sample, which corroborated his confes-
sion. n Only after his initial questioning did Corporal Ophir, who
questioned the accused, inform Issacharov that he was under arrest
and of his right to counsel.2 5
In an 8-1 decision,26 the Israeli Supreme Court acquitted Is-
sacharov of the prior use and possession charges. He was convicted
only for possession of the drugs found on him.27 The Court found that
Issacharov's confession was "free and voluntary" in accordance with
Article 12 of the Israeli Evidence Ordinance in that his personal au-
tonomy had not been compromised.2 8 The Court nevertheless ex-
cluded the confession through a new judicially-created exclusionary
rule for unlawfully obtained evidence. 29 The Court rendered its inno-
vative exclusionary rule part of the larger "Constitutional Revolution"
that has swept Israel since the passage of Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty in 1992.30 The Basic Law, according to the Court, created
a new balance between rectitude of decision and crime control on the
one hand and due process on the other, leading to greater considera-
21. Id. 1 1, at 327.
22. Id.
23. Id. 1 1, at 327-28.
24. Id. 1 1, at 328.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 320. Justice Grunis dissented while Justice Cheshin issued a separate opinion. Id.
at 435, 437. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Israeli Supreme Court typically de-
cides cases in panels of three justices. The Chief Justice or the original panel of three may order
a hearing before a broader panel of an odd number of judges. See Courts Law (Consolidated
Version), 5744-1984 §26, 38 LSI 271 (1983-84) (Isr.). Such larger panels are reserved for ques-
tions of particular significance. See id.
27. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov [2006] 1 3, at 329-30.
28. Id. 36-37, at 374-75. The Court found that since the defendant had been informed of
his right to remain silent, and since after consulting a defense attorney he chose to give a second
statement, the MP's failure to warn him of his right to an attorney did not deem his initial
statement involuntary; it did not compromise his personal autonomy or ability to choose not to
give a statement. Id.
29. Id. 1 80, at 431-33.
30. See id. 1 46-47, 54, at 388-92, 402-03.
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tion for defendants' procedural rights.3 This protection translated
into the greater power and willingness of courts to exclude illegally
obtained evidence, rather than merely discounting its weight as they
had previously (albeit rarely) done under the old doctrine. 32 The deci-
sion was hailed by many in the Israeli press, academia, and criminal
legal practice as "a revolution in Israeli evidence law." 33
In crafting its decision and determining the proper scope of the
exclusionary rule, the Israeli Supreme Court drew heavily on compar-
ative law,34 turning to a series of common law jurisdictions including
the United States, England, Canada, Australia, and South Africa for
inspiration.35 The Court began by considering the primary objectives
that exclusion serves in different legal systems. The Justices distin-
guished the American model, which focuses on deterrence,36 from the
Canadian, English, and South African models, which emphasize exclu-
sion's role in ensuring the fairness of the proceedings and maintaining
judicial integrity.37 The Israeli Court preferred the latter approach.38
Closely linked was the Court's distinction between backward-looking
approaches meant to "erase" or remedy the damage already caused
by the illegal action, and forward-looking approaches aimed at avoid-
ing future injustice that would result from admitting unlawfully ob-
tained evidence against the defendant at trial.39 From these two
distinctions flowed a third: automatic exclusion as opposed to a more
flexible and discretionary rule, with the Israeli Supreme Court prefer-
ring the latter.4"
Drawing heavily on the Canadian Supreme Court's ruling in Col-
lins,4 the Israeli Court articulated three groups of considerations that
31. Id. 9 54, at 402-03.
32. Id. 47, 54, at 390-92, 402-03. It is worth noting that in practice courts rarely dis-
counted the weight of unlawfully obtained evidence.
33. See Blum, supra note 17, at 2131, 2135-36, n. 19.
34. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov [2006] 1 55-66, at 403-18. As we shall see in the following
section, many have criticized the Court's misunderstandings and questionable borrowing of for-
eign law.
35. See id.
36. Id. 1 56, at 405-06.
37. Id. %% 57-59, at 407-10.
38. Id. 1 61, at 413. The Court also mentions the "Protective Principle," but it remains
unclear to what extent this principle has been adopted. See Boaz Sangero, An Exclusionary Rule
for Evidence Obtained Unlawfully as Established in the Issacharov Ruling - Good or Bad Ti-
dings?, 19 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REv. 67, 89-90 (2007). For a discussion of the Protective Princi-
ple, see PETER MIRMELD, Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence 18-19 (1997).
39. Issacharov [2006] 9 60, at 411-12.
40. Id. at 413-14.
41. R. v. Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (Can.). See Issacharov CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov
[2006] 9 57, 73, at 408, 425. For an analysis of the Court's reliance on the Canadian experience,
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may bear on a trial judge's discretion when deciding whether to ex-
clude evidence.42 The first was the nature and severity of the violation
committed by the authorities: 3 whether it was marginal and technical
or intrusive and in breach of a fundamental right; whether the authori-
ties acted malicously or in good faith;" whether extenuating circum-
stances could justify the police's behavior (for example, whether the
police acted to prevent evidence destruction); if there was a ready way
to obtain the evidence legally, a factor that would weigh towards ex-
clusion; and the evidence's "discoverability," i.e. whether the police
would have obtained the evidence, even without infringing the rights
of the accused.45 The second group of considerations addressed the
see Rinat Kitai-Sangero & Yuval Merin, Miranda, Collins and Issacharov: The Gap Between the
Ideal and the Real in the Issacharov Ruling, 37 MISHPATIM 429, 461 (2007). As Don Stuart dem-
onstrates in his article in this volume, the Collins decision has since come under considerable
criticism in Canada and many of its holdings have since been revised. See generally Don Stuart,
Welcome: Flexibility and Better Criteria from the Supreme Court of Canada for the Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, 16 SW J. INT'L.
L. 299, 313 (2010). The Israeli Supreme Court failed to account for many of these criticisms and
shortcomings. Furthermore, even assuming that the Collins decision was sound, the Israeli Su-
preme Court seems to have jumbled some of its tests and considerations in a way that makes
little or no sense.
42. The list was illustrative rather than exhaustive. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov [2006] 74,
at 426.
43. Id. T 70, at 421-22. This group has been linked to the "dissociation rationale," i.e. the
court's need to dissociate itself from the police's action lest its admission of the evidence be
construed as tacit approval of the unlawful methods. See Kitai & Merin, supra note 41, at 469.
44. Id. 70, at 421. The Court notes that if the right infringed was fundamental, the fact the
police acted in good faith will not necessarily save the evidence from exclusion. The definition of
"good faith" remained vague, as we shall see below.
45. Discoverability is comparable to the American inevitable discovery and independent
source exceptions to the exclusionary rule. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 46-50 (2008). The
main rationale for admitting such evidence is that the defendant should not benefit from the
exclusion of evidence that the police would have uncovered anyway, even without employing
unlawful means. To exclude such evidence would provide a windfall to the defendant: not only
would the prosecution not benefit from the police's unlawful action-a consideration that stands
at the core of the exclusionary rule-but it would lose valuable evidence that would have been
discovered anyway. Some believe this to be a pragmatic than principled approach. See Stuart,
supra note 41, at 329. Whitebread and Slobogin convincingly argue that the deterrence rationale
for exclusion does not necessarily support admitting such evidence: if such evidence is admitted,
"police would have no disincentive to engage in illegality when they believe that they already
have a legal source for the evidence or that one will develop shortly." WHITEBREAD &
SLOBOGIN, supra, at 49. A further complication in determining discoverability is establishing
with any degree of certainty whether or not the evidence would have otherwise been uncovered;
this is often highly speculative and fraught with difficulties and hindsight (unlike the previous
query of whether or not the police could have conducted the search or interrogation legally
rather than in the fashion they actually did). The discoverability test has come under considera-
ble criticism in Canada and it appears to have been limited under Grant. See Stuart, supra note
41, at 329. Although discoverability indirectly implicates the severity of the infringement, the
2010] 393
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relation between the violation and the evidence obtained. Courts
would examine the influence that the unlawful means may have had
on the probative value of the evidence, and the evidence's existence
independently of the illegality-or what in Canada has been referred
to as the conscription test.46 An important distinction under this
heading-at least according to the Israeli Supreme Court-was be-
tween testimonial and real evidence.47 Finally, the third group of fac-
tors considered the social price exacted by suppressing the evidence.
The more severe the crime and the more central the evidence to se-
curing a conviction, the less likely exclusion would be.48 The Court
explained that if a finding of guilt rests solely on the proof in question,
test is primarily concerned with the second prong of the Issacharov test-the relation between
the violation and the evidence-rather than to the severity of the police's infringement. Unlike
the question of whether there was a ready way for the police to obtain the evidence legally-that
can be determined apriori and gives us some idea of how flagrant their behavior was, the ques-
tion of discoverability is a counterfactual inquiry that operates through a hindsight comparison:
only after we discover the evidence through unlawful means can we determine whether it would
have been uncovered anyway through conventional (and lawful) investigation techniques. This
post-fact determination-by virtue of being exactly that, a post-fact evaluation-in no way impli-
cates the severity of the violation ex-ante. Police behavior becomes no less (or no more) repre-
hensible if we discover that they would have found the evidence anyway, since they could not
have known that in advance. Rather, discoverability is in many ways associated with the con-
scription test: both address the causal relation between the violation and the evidence obtained.
It is therefore unclear why the Israeli Supreme Court-unlike its Canadian counterpart-in-
cluded discoverability under the first prong, thus implying its relation to the severity of the in-
fringement, as well as artificially severing it from its natural partner, the conscription test. See
Kitai & Merin, supra note 41, at 471. Some have also noted the seeming tension between this
test and the previous one: while the previous test suggests that if the evidence could have been
obtained legally that would weight against admission, this test suggests that if the evidence would
have been obtained lawfully this should weight in favor of admission. See Sangero, supra note
38, at 94-95.
46. Evidence is considered "conscriptive" if the accused is compelled to participate in its
creation or discovery and is either (1) a statement, (2) a bodily sample, (3) its discovery involved
"the use as evidence of the body" of the accused, or (4) is derivative and would not have been
discovered if not for one of the three former conditions. See DAVID M. PACCIOCO & LEE
STUESSER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 352 (5th ed. 2008). As Don Stuart shows in his article, the
conscription test has itself come under considerable criticism in Canada and appears to have
been abandoned under Grant. Stuart, supra note 41 at 316-24.
47. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov [2006] 71, 432-24. This distinction appears to be a misread-
ing of Collins. The Israeli Supreme Court reasoned that real evidence allays concerns regarding
the violation's possible effects on the evidence's reliability. But that is not the focus of the
Canadian conscriptive test, which does not rely on the distinction between real and testimonial.
Urine samples or breathalyzer tests are not testimonial although they are without a doubt con-
scripted. Nor is their reliability adversely affected if obtained through unlawful means.
48. The Israeli Supreme Court noted that Canadian courts tend to attach little significance
to the severity of the crime when determining exclusion. Id. 73, at 425-26. Still, the Court did
not resolve what significance, if any, Israeli courts would attach to this consideration. As we
shall see, this consideration has loomed quite large in Issacharov's application to a degree that it
appears to have trumped all other considerations.
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fighting crime, maintaining the peace and the public's confidence in
the criminal justice system, as well as protecting potential victims, all
might require admission.49 This is true even if the defendant's funda-
mental rights were severely violated.5 °
B. The Issacharov Revolution from A Doctrinal Perspective: Much
Ado About Nothing?
Soon after the smoke from the Court's "Constitutional Revolu-
tion" rhetoric began to settle and scholars had the opportunity to con-
sider the doctrine's practical ramifications more carefully, most began
to question Issacharov's innovation and true significance. After much
anticipation for a strong statement of the Court's liberal values and
hopes for a robust exclusionary rule,51 some scholars went as far as
labeling Issacharov a disappointment; 52 others even suggested that the
decision may have caused more harm than good.53 They were taken
aback by the courts timidity and wondered if the Justices had deliv-
ered on their grand promise to usher in a new era for defendants'
rights.
There were several reasons for disappointment with Issacharov.
First, Israel's revolution came decades after most other democracies
had developed comparable doctrines.54 Beyond its delay, the Court's
49. Id. 72, at 424-25.
50. Id. The Court did, however, note that in Canada these considerations have received
limited weight. The role these considerations would play in Israel was left open. Id. 73, at 425-
26.
51. The appeal was submitted in 1998. It took the Court eight years to decide the case.
Furthermore, it was rendered fourteen years after the 1992 Constitutional Revolution. See
Sangero, supra note 38, at 67-68.
52. See id. at 68, 99.
53. Id. at 68-70. Part of the concern is that the first part of Issacharov eroded the definition
of "free and voluntary" under Article 12 of the Evidence Ordinance in suggesting that a confes-
sion made without proper notice of the right to an attorney should still be considered "free and
voluntary" thus not recognizing counsel's importance in properly informing suspects of their
possible courses of action. A further criticism stems from the Court's holding that since Is-
sacharov was warned of his right to remain silent, and given his later cooperation with police
questioning even after being given access to a lawyer, his autonomy was not fundamentally in-
fringed by not warning him of his right to counsel. According to Sangero, such reasoning ignores
the reality that defendants cannot fully exercise their autonomy without access to an attorney. It
further ignores that once the "cat is out of the bag," suspects tend to believe that all is lost and
are therefore more likely to repeat or elaborate on previous statements, even after consulting an
lawyer. Id. at 79. For my own evaluation of why creating an exclusionary rule but so rarely
applying it might cause more harm to judicial reputation and to public discourse than not having
such a rule at all, see infra.
54. Id. at 68. Sangero argues that the United States established such a rule--or in fact a
more robust one-almost a century earlier and that most European jurisdiction had adopted
such a rule 20 years before Israel. Id.
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doctrine seemed weak and diluted:55 the presumption remained that
relevant and reliable evidence, however obtained, would still be ad-
missible.56 The defendant bore the burden of persuading the Court
that exclusion would be appropriate rather than the prosecution hav-
ing to defend the evidence's admissibility despite the violation. 7 This
presumption, and other aspects of the ruling have been deemed signs
of the Court's continuing prosecutorial bias and reticence to genuinely
embrace due process when it conflicts with crime control. 8
Furthermore, critics deemed the Court misguided in engaging in
ex-post proportionality tests that balance admissibility versus exclu-
sion. They argued that criminal procedure legislation already struck
the necessary ex-ante balances when defining the rules of interroga-
tion, search and seizure, taking into account special circumstances and
allowing for limited exceptions.59 Additional balancing would only
further curtail the already limited liberties of the accused. Some also
criticized the Court's false assumption that it must choose between
deterrence, the protective and the judicial-integrity models as ratio-
nales for exclusion, instead of simply embracing all three.60
Still others pointed out that the Court's alleged shift from dimin-
ishing the weight of illegally obtained evidence towards a discretionary
"exclusionary rule" was mostly semantic. It had little or no practical
55. Id. at 99
56. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov [2006] T 63, at 414-15.
57. Keren Etinger-Shapira & Ron Shapira, The Israeli Disqualification Rule Following Is-
sacharov, 3 DIN UDVARIM (HAIFA L. REV.) 427 (2007). The authors contrast this approach to
the Australian one, wherein the prosecution must justify the reliance on the unlawfully obtained
evidence. The presumption in Australia, by their account, is that the evidence should be ex-
cluded. I must note that in Issacharov, the Court even raises the curious question-which it
leaves unanswered-who should bear the burden of proving basis under which the evidence was
obtained-which should clearly be on the prosecution. See Sangero, supra note 38, at 98. A
more appropriate question would have been by what standard: beyond reasonable doubt or a
preponderance of the evidence. An equally curious question that was left unresolved in Is-
sacharov was whether the prosecution could request the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
or whether this privilege was reserved for only the defendant. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov
[2006] 77, at 429-30. This is a curious statement indeed: it would seem outrageous to exclude
evidence tending to prove the defendant's innocence just because it was obtained illegally. See
Sangero, supra note 38, at 98.
58. Etinger-Shapira & Shapira, supra note 57, at 434, 445.
59. Sangero, supra note 38, at 92-93.
60. See id. at 90. Sangero further argues that although the Court tries to clearly distinguish
between the three rationales, it confounds and leaves ambiguous whether the protective ratio-
nale is to play a role. Id. All that remains clear is that deterrence should not be considered and
that judicial integrity is the guiding factor. To be fair, however, the Court does state that deter-
rence would be a welcome side effect. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov [2006] 61, at 412-13. Al-
though the court seems to place its emphasis on the moral rationale, it does not reject the
protective rationale outright. See id.
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significance in the Israeli legal system, which does not employ juries.61
Arguably, the true significance of an exclusionary rule (versus a rule
concerning weight of evidence) is derived from bifurcation and the
law-finder's ability to conceal the evidence's content, or even its exis-
tence, from the fact-finder. Such bifurcation naturally exists in jury
trials, but may also be achieved in bench trials by having a different
judge rule on motions to exclude; but this procedure was not adopted
in Israel. This seemingly cosmetic change, coupled with the doctrine's
weakness, led some to believe that the Supreme Court's true intention
was to signal its affiliation with other legal traditions, particularly the
common law, rather than truly embrace the ideological underpinnings
of the exclusionary rule.62
The Court also came under attack for its three-prong test and the
long list of factors it considered relevant to suppression. Some pointed
out that by simply listing the possible considerations, the Court pro-
vided little or no guidance as to their weight in relation to one an-
other, leaving the doctrine vague and overly flexible.6 3 Moreover, in
deeming the list of considerations illustrative rather than exhaustive,
Issacharov essentially left judges unfettered discretion.64
Furthermore, Issachaorov's three-prong test and its list of factors
raised serious questions of whether the Court may have included im-
pertinent considerations, and perhaps even misclassified them within
the three prongs.65 First, the Court was criticized for suggesting that
the more crucial the evidence to securing a conviction, the less prone
courts should be to exclude it. This test implied that the Court was
willing to stand by its lofty ideals primarily when they made no differ-
ence because there was sufficient, lawfully-obtained evidence to con-
vict. The Court wished to have its cake and eat it too:6 6 it wanted to
create an exclusionary rule "on the cheap," while avoiding suppres-
sion's most difficult dilemma, and without genuinely sacrificing recti-
tude of decision or crime control.
61. Blum, supra note 17, at 2139-42; Etinger-Shapira & Shapira, supra note 58 at 431-33,
439.
62. Blum, supra note 17, at 2160; see also Sangero, supra note 38, at 97. On the relationship
between legal transplants and signaling in the Israeli legal system more broadly, see Assaf
Likhovski, Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal Transplants and Signaling, 10 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES L. 619 (2009).
63. Kitai & Merin, supra note 41, at 429-430.
64. Sangero, supra note 38, at 93.
65. For example, it was unclear why discoverability would bear on the severity of the in-
fringements. See supra text accompanying note 45.
66. Sangero, supra note 38, at 97.
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A related critique was the Court's mention of the severity of the
crime as a relevant consideration against suppression. Sangero com-
mented sarcastically that the exclusionary rule might be reserved for
parking violations.67 He reasoned that even the International Crimi-
nal Court, which tries the most atrocious crimes and criminals, is
mindful of their rights as defendants and allows for the exclusion of
evidence obtained contrary to internationally recognized norms.68
Specifically, article 69(7) of the Rome Statute states, "Evidence ob-
tained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recog-
nized human rights shall not be admissible if... the admission of the
evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the in-
tegrity of the proceedings., 69 Others suggested that courts must show
the greatest vigilance towards the rights of those accused of heinous
crimes because the risks of false conviction are highest there.70  An
approach confining the exclusionary rule only to contraventions or
misdemeanors would also suggest, to both the police and the public at
large, the existence of a constitution-free zone, where authorities do
as they please and courts turn a blind eye. Such public cynicism would
contribute little to judicial integrity and reputation.
Some criticized the Court for inserting questions of reliability into
a doctrine fundamentally concerned with public policy.7" The Court's
second prong, which examined the relation between the violation and
67. Id. at 96.
68. Id.
69. Sangero, supra note 38, at 96.
70. Etinger-Shapira & Shapira, supra note 57, at 440-51. The authors embark on a compar-
ative journey, showing that in Australia-which the Court cites in connection with this factor-
the severity of the crime as a consideration has come under considerable attack and has since
been abandoned. I found that in their treatment of the issue, the authors tended to confound the
exclusion of unreliable evidence with the exclusion of reliable, yet illegally obtained evidence.
See id. False convictions are a risk only if the evidence obtained unlawfully is also perceived as
unreliable. But seeing that the exclusionary rule is primarily concerned with public policy rather
than reliability, one can see why such a balance might still be influenced by the severity of the
crime. The authors recognize this towards the end of their article but nevertheless think the
Court did not make its opinion sufficiently clear, which may in fact be the case. See id.at 451. Be
this as it may, I share the authors' concern that in severe crimes-especially where the police
enjoy broad public support, either generally or against that particular criminal-the fear of po-
lice abuse is heightened. Therefore it is precisely in such instances that the judicial system must
show heightened awareness towards the defendants' rights as a matter of deterrence but also as a
matter of judicial integrity. I shall discuss this issue further when we come to national security
investigations in Israel and the question of necessity.
71. Kitai & Merin, supra note 41, at 474-75. As Alex Stein has explained, the exclusionary
rule, along with a number of other evidence-related rules and doctrines, is "driven by concerns
altogether extraneous to fact-finding." ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 25
(2005). As such, Stein has gone so far as stating that such rules "do not belong to the law of
evidence" since their "affiliation to evidence law exhibits contingent instrumentality, rather than
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the evidence, seemed to reintroduce reliability considerations, repre-
senting a throwback to the pre-Issacharov doctrine.7 2 By weighing
credibility as a central factor, courts might tend to exclude illegally
obtained evidence primarily or only if its credibility was also tainted,
which misses the mark of the true significance of the exclusionary
rule: it is precisely because the evidence is reliable that excluding it is
so difficult, and speaks volumes about the legal system's devotion to
its constitutional values. If the evidence was not only unlawfully ob-
tained but also inherently unreliable, forgoing it does not sacrifice-
but rather contributes to-verdict accuracy. In such instances, due
process and trial fairness are on the same side of the scales.7 3
A related criticism touched on the Court's undue focus in the sec-
ond prong on the distinction between real and testimonial evidence, 74
which as we shall see, looms large in the application of Issacharov by
lower courts.75 Sangero argues that one of the exclusionary rule's
greatest potential contributions to Israeli jurisprudence would have
been the license it gave to suppress physical evidence, which Article
12's "free and voluntary" test, which applies only to confessions, does
not authorize. 76 But the Court suggested that real evidence would be
less likely to be excluded due to its reliability. Rinat Kitai-Sangero
and Yuval Merin suggest that the real-testimonial distinction, though
perhaps pertinent to reliability, had been unduly confounded with the
question of whether or not the evidence existed irrespective of the
violation-a misreading by the Israeli Court of the Canadian conscrip-
tion test.77
immutable bond." Id. at 27. What characterizes such rules is that their "design and operation
are evidence-related, but their essence is not evidential." Id.
72. Kitai & Merin, supra note 41, at 475; Sangero, supra note 38, at 95.
73. As noted above, this fear was further strengthened by the Court's statement that admis-
sion would remain the rule and that it would also consider the evidence's centrality for convic-
tion, all of which suggested that rectitude of decision would still trump all other considerations.
74. Kitai & Merin, supra note 41, at 479.
75. As Kitai and Merin argue, to the degree that this distinction emerged in Canada under
R. v. Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 37 (Can.), it was abandoned-long before Issacharov-in the
Stillman case and was replaced by the conscription test (now itself defunct after Grant) which
does not draw a clear line between physical and testimonial evidence per se. See Kitai & Merin,
supra note 41, at 479-80. Physical evidence may in some cases nevertheless be conscripted-as it
was in the Issacharov case-where the defendant was forced to participate in its creation or
discovery. The conscription test goes to the fairness of introducing such evidence, and implicates
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, but should not be tied too closely to the
physical/testimonial divide.
76. Sangero, supra note 38, at 95.
77. See Kitai & Merin, supra note 41, at 479-83; Collins, 1 S.C.R. 265, 284-85.
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This last observation is related to a broader flaw that seemed to
characterize Issacharov's use of comparative law. In their interna-
tional quest for an appropriate model, the Israeli Supreme Court not
only failed to account for relevant differences-both social and le-
gal-between Israel and the countries surveyed;78 in some cases, the
Court also seemed to misstate the foreign doctrine or neglected to
account for the intellectual and practical knots that entangled these
doctrines in their native lands. Arguably, one of the strengths of com-
parative law is precisely that it allows us to explore and learn from the
experience of others, both positive and negative. But the Israeli Su-
preme Court appeared to do neither. For example, Kitai and Merin
noted that in Canada, discoverability was correctly categorized as
bearing on the relation between the evidence and the unlawful behav-
ior, not on the egregiousness of the illegal means as it was in Israel.79
The Court was also charged with paying inadequate attention to pub-
lic debates and to developments in case law in Canada, the United
Kingdom, and in Australia on whether the severity of the crime
should be considered relevant, and if so, how.80
Even if one accepted the Court's list of considerations, Issacharov
remained a narrow ruling in an easy case, providing little practical gui-
dance for lower courts. 81 First, the Court found that Corporal Ophir
acted not only knowingly, but maliciously, when he failed to inform
Issacharov of his right to an attorney.82 Second, as a clear and imme-
diate result of Ophir's omission, Issacharov confessed to possession of
marijuana and provided a bodily sample pointing to prior use-both
conscripted pieces of evidence (even though the urine sample was
physical and hence reliable). The causal relation between the viola-
tion and the evidence was further proved in that after consulting an
attorney, Issacharov declined to comment on instances of prior pos-
session and use. 83 Third, the defendant's youth and inexperience with
the police made it likely he was unaware of his rights. Fourth, both
possession and use of marijuana are minor crimes that often go un-
prosecuted, making it relatively easy for the Court to acquit without
the moral qualms associated with setting a dangerous criminal free.84
78. Blum, supra note 17, at 2140.
79. Kitai & Merin, supra note 41, at 471.
80. Etinger-Shapira & Shapira, supra note 57, at 443-45.
81. Blum, supra note 17, at 2167.
82. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] T 81, reprinted in 2006(1)
Isr. L. Rep. 320. 432.
83. Id. at T 1.
84. Blum, supra note 17, at 2164, n. 144.
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And marijuana found on Issacharov's person still left sufficient evi-
dence to convict him of drug possession. Issacharov therefore fit
neatly within the Court's list of considerations, weighing almost en-
tirely in favor of exclusion.
But it remained unclear how lower courts should or would apply
Issacharov in harder cases, where the Court's extensive list of factors
seemed to pull in opposite directions. With a list so long, complicated,
and often contradictory, the "exclusionary rule" hardly looked like a
rule at all: judges wishing to admit unlawfully obtained evidence
would have little difficulty distinguishing the case before them from
Issacharov. Similarly, those wishing to exclude evidence would find
ample authority within Issacharov's language to justify their ruling.85
Ultimately, it appeared that Issacharov's primary strength laid in its
rhetoric. What remained to be determined was how far its spirit
would carry lower courts and how they would apply the Court's highly
flexible guidelines. Critics of the decision remained hopeful that
lower courts might nevertheless seize on its rhetoric and distill Is-
sacharov's spirit from its weak flesh, delivering on the Court's yet un-
fulfilled promise of a Constitutional Revolution.
That is precisely what the next chapter seeks to examine: how
have lower courts in Israel, and the Supreme Court itself, interpreted
Issacharov? Has it in fact resulted in a meaningful ban on unlawfully
obtained evidence or has exclusion remained an exception, rather
than the rule? In what cases have courts suppressed evidence and
how do they justify their decisions when they do-or perhaps more
interestingly when they do not? Which considerations in Issacharov's
long list have taken root in Israel? It is this line of questions we turn
to now.
III. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: ISSACHAROV IN THE COURTS
The previous section suggested a near-consensus among Israeli
scholars that from a doctrinal standpoint, Issacharov suffered from
considerable shortcomings. But notwithstanding its flaws and incon-
sistencies, Issacharov still had the potential to set the Israeli legal sys-
tem on a different course, one that would take defendants' rights
more seriously. In the following section we take a closer look at the
trends that have emerged since Issacharov. These point to troubling
85. Had deterrence been a primary objective, arguably lack of certainty would supply
enough deterrence for police to play by the rules without providing the windfall gain for guilty
defendants. But given that the Court did not adopt this rationale it is not clear that sporadic and
inconsistent application of the rule actually serves the Court's objectives.
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phenomena: despite the formal introduction of an exclusionary rule,
its application has remained extremely limited. Furthermore, in many
ways Issacharov's problematic application appears to have exceeded
its critics' worst predictions.
A. Methodology
To examine Issacharov's interpretation and determine its true im-
pact on Israeli criminal procedure, I have coded and analyzed a
dataset of 126 cases decided between May 4, 2006 and November 1,
2009 that addressed the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence.
These represent the entire population of opinions available online
that have invoked Issacharov. To provide a comprehensive view of
Issacahrov's effects and look beyond high-profile cases, the dataset
includes not only Supreme Court decisions but also rulings by the dis-
trict and magistrates' courts in relatively minor offenses. Supreme
Court decisions constitute only slightly more than a fifth of the deci-
sions analyzed. Using the Nevo online database, I identified 54 magis-
trate court decisions, 44 district court decisions, and 28 Supreme
Court rulings addressing the exclusion of unlawfully obtained
evidence.86
Each of the 126 cases was analyzed with a view at determining
how courts have interpreted the facts before them in light of Is-
sacharov's tests. The analysis consisted of two stages: first, an exami-
nation of how courts have applied a particular test to the facts they
have found; second, an evaluation of the relative weight given to that
test or fact in relation to other prongs of Issacharov's multi-faceted
test. Particular attention was paid to issues that scholars have flagged
as problematic or questionable in Issacharov, as well as issues that the
Supreme Court itself left unresolved in that decision. Still, I have also
been cognizant of additional considerations, both explicit and implicit,
86. The decisions fall into two main categories: decisions on motions to exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence and final criminal verdicts that include rulings on such motions. Due to time
and access constraints, the sample does not include military and juvenile court rulings, though it
would be interesting to examine whether different trends emerge from analyzing the decisions of
those courts. The sample also does not include decisions on detention pending trial, which often
raises questions of how to treat unlawfully obtained evidence: under Israeli law, the prosecution
must present prima facie evidence of the defendant's guilt to justify such detention. See Crimi-
nal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers-Arrests) 5756 - 1996, §21(B) (Isr.). It is questiona-
ble whether only admissible evidence should be evaluated as part of the prosecution's prima
facie case in such motions. Arguably, the prosecution should be allowed some latitude, assuming
that the investigation is not yet over and that they might be able to offer similar evidence from a
lawful source.
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that although not mentioned in Issacharov have nevertheless mani-
fested themselves in subsequent rulings.
B. The Judges
Perhaps one of the most significant findings of this study is the
strong correlation between exclusion and the identity of the judge de-
ciding the case. Of 14 exclusions resulting in acquittals (partial or full)
almost half can be traced to only two judges; Shmuel Landman and
Dan Mor of the Tel Aviv Magistrate's Court are each responsible for
three decisions. Beyond their tendency to exclude evidence, both
seem to apply stricter standards towards police activity in related con-
texts, in some cases contrary to case law. For example, both judges
have ruled that absent reasonable suspicion, a defendant must provide
informed consent to a search and may not be assumed to consent by
acquiescence.8 They have ruled that absent informed consent the
search will be deemed unlawful and its findings suppressed.88 In some
such cases Landman has also excluded subsequent confessions, adopt-
ing the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, despite the Supreme
Court's explicit rejection of that doctrine in Issacharov.89
Judge Mor, a former prosecutor, has gained a strong reputation
as an anti-prosecutorial judge.9° According to some sources, his atti-
tude towards prosecutors has led to his recent ban from ruling on
criminal cases.91 Judge Landman seems to have been somewhat more
responsive to appellate court criticism of his strict standards on search
and seizure, though he seems to have devised other methods for ac-
87. This would seem, at least formally, to be the legal situation in England. See STEPEHEN
C. THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CASEBOOK APPROACH 54 (2d. ed. 2008).
"The person concerned must be clearly informed that they are not obliged to consent and any-
thing seized may be produced in evidence."
88. See Crim (TA) 6585/06 State v. Gueta 91 8 [2009] (unpublished); Crim (Tel Aviv); 6454/
07 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] (unpublished).
89. See CrimA (TA) 70490/08 State of Israel v. Kasser 16.
90. In a particularly high profile case recently, Mor released a defendant who was placed
under arrest pending trial because the police had conducted an improper line-up. Chief Superin-
tendent Benny Peles, commander of the Mesubin station, reportedly reacted by saying: "It is
merely the decision of a magistrate court judge." See Avi Ashkenazi, The Judge and the Police
Fight, While Tel Aviv Criminals Benefit, NRG, Feb. 5, 2010, http://www.nrg.co.il/ontine/1/ART2/
050/807.html. For a critical analysis of this comment by Superintendent Peles, see Ze'ev Segal,
Merely Judges, HAARETZ, Feb. 1, 2010, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasite/spages/
1146554.html.
91. See Amit Ben-Aroya, Lawyers Express Concern: The Prosecution is Targeting Judges,
and That is Dangerous, THE MARKER, Feb. 16, 2010, available at http://www.themarker.com/tmc/
article.jhtml?ElementId=skira20100216j1149993. Still, some believe that it was Mor who re-
quested to be reassigned to civil cases only.
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quitting defendants who he believes were searched unfairly.92 These
findings suggest that Issacharov has more to do with the identity of the
judge and the judge's general outlook on proper police powers than
with the actual doctrine. The exclusionary rule seems to be applied
mainly by "rogue judges," rather than by the judicial system as a
whole. We shall return to these observations in the final part of the
study.
C. Severity of the Crime as Trump
As discussed in the theoretical analysis, it is questionable whether
the severity of the crime should factor into motions to exclude and
whether it should have found its way into Issacharov. The Court
seems aware of the scholarly critique and the problems inherent in
that test: in Zeliger,93 Justice Levi in dicta expressed his doubts to that
effect. Notwithstanding Levi's reservations, the severity of the crime
has largely determined the scope and reach of the exclusionary rule; it
has dominated the weighing tests conducted by courts, both explicitly
and implicitly.
Let us begin by noting the implicit: in the 14 cases since Is-
sacharov in which evidence has been excluded (four of which were
overturned on appeal), only one was for a crime punishable by more
92. Crim (TA) 6951/07 State of Israel v. Soldetenko [2009]. Judge Landman ruled that al-
though the police had no reasonable basis for conducting the search-which in Crim (TA) 6585/
06 State of Israel v. Gueta T 8 (unpublished) he ruled would itself deem the search illegal even if
the defendant acquiesced-nevertheless under district court precedent the defendant's acquies-
cence deemed the evidence admissible. But although Judge Landman did not exclude the evi-
dence, he found that the defendant lawfully held the dagger in the car along with other tools and
that in any event it was an old dagger that the defendant received from his grandfather and
therefore should not lead to a criminal conviction.
93. See CrimA 645/05 Zeliger v. State of Israel [2006] 26 (unpublished). Justice Levi
wrote:
I see fit to note that we must be extremely cautious in weighing these considera-
tions [centrality of the evidence and the severity of the crime] since.., the more severe
the offense attributed to the defendant the more favorable to the prosecution the rules
of evidence might seem. It is clear that these ramifications are not desirable in our
legal system, which underscores due process for the defendant while protecting his
rights. Therefore, I do not see a reason to give much weight to the crimes that the
defendant committed and to the fact that the evidence is crucial for his conviction.
The Court nevertheless found the police's non-compliance with protocol in this instance margi-
nal (albeit intentional), therefore not warranting exclusion. See id. Justice Levi held that the
police were justified in not having the defendant sign a reenactment report due to the strong
necessity to foil the activities of a Jewish terrorist organization: hence, the justification was pre-
ventative. See id. He further held that it was the defendant's lack of cooperation that made the
digression from protocol necessary; had the police not taken such measures, it is doubtful
whether they would have obtained the evidence they needed. Id. 1 26. We shall return to the
relationship between preventative justifications, necessity and the exclusionary rule later, when
addressing the Smirk ruling.
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than seven years imprisonment.94 Courts have been willing to disre-
gard illegally obtained evidence primarily in minor offenses, within
the jurisdiction of Israel's magistrates' courts.95
The offenses in which evidence was excluded share a number of
other related characteristics. Many are crimes of negligence rather
than criminal intent (e.g. negligent homicide and medical malprac-
tice); a significant subset are preparation crimes, meant to capture po-
tential criminals before they have acted or even attempted to act (e.g.
knife and break-in tool possession); additionally, they are often vic-
timless crimes or crimes where the state is the direct victim (e.g. antiq-
uity theft, tax and social security fraud). And a large subset of these
cases, especially those affirmed on appeal, are white-collar crimes (tax
fraud and business operation without a license).96 They are typically
not violent crimes. That is perhaps why Israeli courts have been more
willing to exclude the evidence and see defendants go free.
Courts have also been explicit in citing the severity of the crime at
their reason for admission. In Farhi, the defendant was charged with
rape and sodomy. The Tel Aviv District Court held that if it were to
accept the defendant's motion to exclude the evidence, a person who
had "committed very severe crimes and who poses a real and concrete
threat to others, especially women and in particular helpless girls,
would go free and could carry on committing such crimes.'" The
94. These include three instances of knife possession (two of which were later overturned),
one instance of break-in-tool possession (overturned), one instance of theft from an automobile
and intent of auto-theft, one instance of possession of stolen goods (defendant was still convicted
of dealing in antiquities without a license), one instance of drug possession for personal usage,
one case of VAT fraud (overturned), one case of income tax fraud, one case of social security
fraud, one instance of business operation without a license, one case of creating a life-threaten-
ing risk through negligent medical treatment, and one instance of negligent homicide.
95. The seven-year mark is significant because it determines the jurisdictional boundaries
between the Israeli magistrates' and district courts: crimes punishable by fine or less than seven-
years imprisonment are within the jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts and may be appealed to
the district court. Other crimes are within the original jurisdiction of the district courts and may
be appealed as a matter of right to the Supreme Court. See Courts Law (Consolidated Version),
5744-1984 51(a)(1), 38 LSI 271 (1983-84) (Isr.). An alternative classification could have been
the distinction between felony and non-felony charges, with the threshold being three-years im-
prisonment. See Penal Law, 5737-1977 24, 8 LSI 136 (1977) (Isr.).
96. In some of these cases the defendants were misled to think that the evidence was col-
lected for internal review or disciplinary purposes and would not be used against him in a crimi-
nal proceeding. See Crim (Hadera) 2037/05 State of Israel v. Uzana [2007] (unpublished); Crim
(Kerayot) 433/06 State of Israel v. Atias 12(B) [2007] (unpublished).
97. CrimC (TA) 1084/06 State of Israel v. Farhi [2007] 15, at 13 (unpublished). Although
the court addressed this aspect under the defendant's claim for abusive proceedings, it neverthe-
less analyzed the claim comparing it to Issacharov and making reference to the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree doctrine.
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court went on to note that unlike Issacharov, this was not a man
charged with possession and use of recreational drugs.98
An extreme example of this approach is the Mubarack case99 in
which the defendant-a male Palestinian prostitute-was charged
with the murder of a male Jewish-Israeli client."° The Tel Aviv Dis-
trict Court's opinion discloses what can be described only as an ongo-
ing physically and mentally abusive interrogation, replete with verbal
and psychological abuse,1"' denial of sleep, °' food, and access to
counsel. Mubarack was not informed of the precise charges against
him even after these had taken form in his interrogators' minds;103 he
was subjected to threats and given false promises." 4 He was alsoplaced in painful positions105 and continually interrogated for approxi-
mately 20 hours.106 The decision to admit Mubarack's confession
turned on the argument that time had severed the relation between
the abuses and the defendant's confession. 7 Nevertheless, the Tel
Aviv District Court also cited the severity of the crime as a reason why
the abuse should not trigger exclusion.' 018
98. Id. 15.
99. CrimC (TA) 1060/07 State of Israel v. Mubarack [2008] (unpublished) (ruling on motion
to exclude the defendant's confession).
100. See id.
101. Id. at 28-29. The police called the defendant a cockroach, a terrorist who killed his
client because he belongs to Hammas, a stupid Arab, who for NIS 100 lets someone "bang them
from behind." They also expressed regret that the defendant was not in Saudi Arabia, where he
would not have lived to see the age of 18. The court expressed its disgust with the language used
by the police, but still did not exclude the confession because the causation between the abuse
and the confession was severed: many of these statements were made on May 4, whereas the
defendant finally confessed on May 7.
102. Id. at 39. The district court initially held that although the defendant was initially de-
nied sleep, he later could not sleep on his own accord, which therefore did not deem the interro-
gation unlawful.
103. CrimC (TA) 1060/07 State of Israel v. Mubarack [2008] 1(a), at 17 (unpublished).
104. For example, he was threatened that if he did not cooperate his father would be in-
formed of his occupation. Id. at 40-41.
105. Id. at 35. The day before he confessed, the defendant was handcuffed while sitting on a
chair for over seven hours.
106. Id. at 32. The Court nevertheless deemed this extended interrogation necessary and
legal given the circumstances and the need to find the truth.
107. The court found that he was provided with food and rest during the time leading up to
his confession.ld. at 39.
108. Id. at 26 (citing the Smirk case which is discussed in greater detail later in this article).
The court wrote:
On this matter there is a crucial importance to the distinction between the kinds of
offenses. Thus, if we are dealing with particularly severe crimes, and of course includ-
ing the murder charges against the defendant, the balancing point between the various
rights and interests will vary, and the matter of exclusion will be determined
accordingly.
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1. What is a Severe Crime?
Courts favor admission not only when addressing truly heinous
crimes such as murder or rape. What is considered too high a social
cost to acquit under Issacharov has proved a malleable standard that
has been construed quite broadly. Motions to exclude are rejected on
these grounds in even relatively minor offenses such a social security
fraud.109 A more prevalent example of this approach is judicial treat-
ment of knife possession charges, 1 ° which represent a significant sub-
set of motions to suppress."' In a series of rulings by both trial and
appellate courts, knife possession has been portrayed as a severe
crime, thereby weighing heavily in favor of admitting knives found as
a result of unlawful searches. To bolster this notion, lower courts have
relied on the Israeli Supreme Court's harsh words condemning the
spread of knife related violence,' 1 2 referring to it as a "knife subcul-
ture. 1 1 3 Courts have also cited legislation that has re-categorized
knife possession as a felony rather than a misdemeanor, raising the
maximum sentence from three to five years' imprisonment." 4
Id. at 26. In this the district court fundamentally misstated the holding in Issacharov, which did
not settle the weight that should be given to the severity of the crime.
109. See, e.g., Crim (Jer.) 2563/06 State of Israel v. Eli Biton [2009] 111 (unpublished). The
case dealt with social security fraud, where defendant was not warned of his right to remain
silent and right to an attorney. The Jerusalem Magistrate's Court found that excluding the evi-
dence will have "no social benefit, while the damage from excluding it will be considerable, since
social security is meant to provide benefits to the needy. The investigation was meant not only
to catch those committing fraud against the SSA but also to prevent potential cheaters from
getting a slice of the welfare cake, which is intended for the truly needy." Id. 9 11(f).
110. To an American audience this offense may seem unusual, perhaps even unconstitu-
tional. Nevertheless, as my dataset suggests, in Israel this is not an infrequent charge-meaning
that it is not only in the books, but a law that is actually enforced, and in a troubling manner.
Furthermore, knife possession is a crime of simple rather than compound possession; it does not
specify a minimum blade size, and is now a felony punishable by five years' imprisonment. Fur-
thermore, it includes an unusual burden of proof, which forces the defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he possessed the knife for a lawful purpose. For an applica-
tion of this rule, see Crim (Hi) 13661-07-08 State v. Razilov [2009] at 11 (unpublished).
111. Knife possession charges represented twelve of the fifty-five cases of the exclusionary
cases addressed by the magistrate courts, and twelve of nineteen cases dealing with suppression
of physical evidence. In three of these cases the magistrates' court suppressed the evidence, but
two of the rulings were later overturned by the district court.
112. Crim A (TA) 7250/09 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] 91 23 (unpublished); citing
CrimA 2047/07 Hanuk v. The State of Israel [20071 (unpublished decision), which referred to the
spreading "knife subculture." We should note, however, that in Hanuk which is widely cited by
lower courts as proof of the Supreme Court's harsh rebuke of knife possession, the defendant
not only carried a knife but also stabbed the victim in his stomach. Therefore, this was not an
inchoate crime of preparation like knife possession.
113. Using the term "knife subculture" clearly invokes criminology's subcultural theory. See
generally, ALBERT K. COHEN, DELINQUENT Boys: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG 49 (1955).
114. Crim A (TA) 7250/09 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] 1 25 (unpublished).
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Without underestimating the problem of knife-related violence in
Israel, we must assess whether such crimes should be labeled "severe"
under Issacharov. If severity of the crime should be relevant at all,
such labels must apply only to the most heinous crimes, such as mur-
der, rape, or armed robbery, or to instances in which the knife was
violently used, not only carried. Otherwise, this test becomes
meaningless.
A closer look at knife-possession case law discloses disturbing po-
lice practices associated with such charges: police often engage in un-
lawful and harassing searches of suspects who have had prior fallouts
with the law. Even when such searches do not yield the evidence they
expected, police sometimes still discover knives that they then report
to the district attorney, who usually prosecutes them successfully. In
some cases, these are small knives attached to lighters or key-
chains,115 or kitchen knives carried in a car,"16 which hardly seem like
the hazard that the legislation sought to criminalize. Courts have still
convicted, despite the illegality of the searches.
It is difficult to determine whether courts genuinely consider so-
cial security fraud or knife possession to be severe crimes or are in-
stead using these considerations simply to "check the box" on the
Issacharov checklist and justify their decision to admit evidence. Ei-
ther way, expanding the category of severe crime under Issacharov
warrants Sangero's fear that exclusion will be reserved only for park-
ing violations or comparable infractions.
2. The Exception That Proves the Rule: Elzam
The only case involving a truly severe crime in which unlawfully
obtained evidence was excluded was the appeal of Yoni Elzam.'17
Based on his own confession, Elzam was convicted by the district
court for conspiracy and premeditated murder. 18 He first confessed
to undercover agents who posed as fellow cellmates, later repeating
115. See Crim (BS) 1519/06 State of Israel v. Sabag [2008] (unpublished); CrimA 7250/09
(TA) State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] $ 27-30, at 9 (unpublished).
116. See Crim (Ramle) 5568/06 State of Israel v. Karimov [2008] 2 (unpublished). Com-
pare Crim (KG) 106/06 State of Israel v. Naula [2008] (unpublished), where the court acquitted
the defendant of knife possession. The court acquitted the defendant since he had just received
the knife from his girlfriend as a gift. Since he did not leave the house with the knife, he lacked
the requisite mens rea. Id. 29. Still, here too the court admitted the knife as evidence even
though it was obtained unlawfully. The court reasoned that the search did not involve violence
and was not sufficiently intrusive. Id. T 25.
117. CrimA 1301/06 Estate of Elzam v. State of Israel [2009] (unpublished).
118. Id. 1 1.
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his statement to uniformed investigators.' 1 9 The main question on ap-
peal was whether Elzam's confession should be excluded due to the
undercover agents' dubious techniques, and given the denial of
Elzam's access to counsel. 120
In excluding his confession and acquitting the defendant, Justice
Hayut ruled that although the police may have acted without malice,
Elzam's fundamental right to counsel, his privilege against self-incrim-
ination, and his right to due process had been infringed.' 2 ' Writing for
a 2-1 majority, Hayut ruled that the undercover agents overstepped
their authority when they "systematically acted to undermine" the de-
fendant's confidence in his lawyer. They aggressively persuaded
Elzam to forgo his right to silence, which his attorney had advised him
to invoke, and which he eventually waived. 122  Allowing Elzam's
choice to confess may have stemmed from his desire to clear his con-
science, Hayut doubted whether he would have done so had it not
been for the police's problematic methods.'2 3 Denying the defendant
access to counsel after he confessed to the undercover agents was also
held unlawful: it did not conform with the statutory requirement for
written authorization by an officer over the rank of superintendent. 24
Hayut explained that delaying or denying access to counsel is already
119. Id.
120. Id. Elzam was denied access to his lawyer between his confession to the undercover
agents and his overt interrogation. Id. 1 10.
121. Id. 8.
122. Id. 5. The agents allegedly told the defendant that his lawyer was lazy and was not
taking the proper legal steps to secure his release. They added that the lawyer was in a conflict
of interests since he represented Elzam's coconspirator and furthermore, that lawyers often con-
spire with the police against their clients. The agents further misled the defendant about the
consequences of waiving his rights and suggested that the police would share more information
with him if he cooperated. The right to silence was portrayed by the undercover agents as finan-
cially beneficial to defense counsel, but against the interests of the defendant. Id. 6. Justice
Hayut deemed the agents' acts "over-involvement" and invasion of the defendant's "protected
zone." Id. 6. She explained that although the Israeli legal system continues to allow "active"
undercover agents (unlike some other systems) in this case the agents overstepped the line. Id.
7. They infringed on both the defendant's right to silence and to an attorney. Id. Justice Hayut
left open whether the uniformed police investigators-after warning the defendant-could have
acted to undermine his confidence in his attorney in that fashion, since the defendant was aware
of their identity. Id. Similarly, the Court did not rule whether it would have excluded the state-
ments had been made to real cellmates. Id.
123. See id. Hayut concluded that even when confessing to investigators, Elzam's admission
of guilt stemmed from his sense of isolation and distrust of his attorney, which were conse-
quences of the undercover agents' work. In dicta, Hayut went so far as ruling that the confession
could be considered not to be "free and voluntary" since the defendant's autonomy and ability
to truly choose whether or not to give a statement had been compromised, which should itself
lead to exclusion regardless of the statement's veracity or of the Issacharov tests. Id. 1 9.
124. See id.
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an exceptional measure; doing so without proper authorization consti-
tuted a substantive breach of Elzam's rights.' 25
While Elzam provides important guidelines regarding the lawful
use of undercover informants, we must note the decision's particulari-
ties. These raise some doubts concerning Elzam's true significance as
an application of the exclusionary rule. Perhaps most noteworthy is a
fact barely mentioned in the ruling, but that provides indispensible
context for this uncharacteristically successful motion to exclude: the
appeal was submitted in 2006 by the defendant's estate. Elzam died of
cyanide poisoning in prison on December 12, 2005, a month after his
conviction, and the day before he was scheduled to testify against his
coconspirator. 126 The Elzam ruling is therefore quite unusual in that
it was submitted after the defendant's death. 127
125. Id. 1 11. The police's stated rationale for postponing the meeting-that the investigation
had reached a critical phase, so allowing the defendant access to counsel would have set back the
momentum-was also rejected by the Court. Hayut further noted that there were absolutely no
grounds for postponing the meeting until after the reenactment, which took place the following
day. The trial court's reference to the confession reliability as grounds for its admissibility was
deemed insufficient under Issacharov. Id. We must note that the lower court decision was ren-
dered six months before Issacharov. See CrimC (TA) 1023/04 State of Israel v. Elzam [2005]
(unpublished decision). But the decision was still subject to Issacahrov's tests and standards. As
we shall see below, there has been some doubt in the courts about Issacharov's retroactive
application.
126. See HAARETZ, Dec. 14, 2005, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/
697842.html.
127. Proceedings against criminal defendants are typically abated post-mortem. Criminal
Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) § 236 (1982) (Isr.), states "Should a defendant die, all
criminal proceedings against him shall be abated." Still, Rule 36 of the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure seems to allow courts to continue deliberating on a pending appeal (though it does not
mandate the court to rule). But it is doubtful whether an appeal may commence after the defen-
dant's death, as it did in Elzam. The language of the Rule does not seem to support such a
position. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5734-1974 (Isr.), R. 36 states that "Should an appeal be
pending at the time of the defendant's death, the court may allow the hearing to continue and
determine that the defendant's family member, heir, executor of his will or administrator of his
estate will continue the appeal in the defendant's stead" (emphasis added). Case law has also
not established such a right, especially if the defendant has only been sentenced to serve in
prison. Where the sentence includes a fine, there are perhaps good reasons to allow an appeal to
go forward even after the defendant's death: a fine directly affects the estate of the defendant
and his heirs. See e.g. CrimA 1619/00 Alruzi v. State of Israel [2000] (unpublished). In that case
the defendant had been fined the sum of NIS 1,500 and his appeal before the Supreme Court
was pending when he died. Following the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court elected to
rule, waived the fine and went on to annul the proceeding under §236 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), § 236 (1982) (Isr.). In Elzam, however,
the Court simply dismissed this entire issue by noting that the parties had not raised it. CrimA
1301/06 Estate of Elzam v. State of Israel [2009] (unpublished) 1. A post-mortem acquittal
based on the exclusion of an illegally obtained confession, like that of Elzam, to some degree
also negates the potential significance a posthumous acquittal might still have: unlike an acquit-
tal based on a lack of reliable evidence or a positive finding of innocence, such an acquittal does
little to clear the defendant's reputation. According to Elzam's father, that was precisely his
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Regardless of the philosophical merits of allowing posthumous
appeals, the decision attests to a more profound point: the Supreme
Court is willing to exclude evidence and acquit defendants mainly
when the practical ramifications of such decisions are limited. Like
Private Issacharov, whose probation had expired by the time the Su-
preme Court had acquitted him,128 Elzam gained nothing from the
exclusion of his confession. Nor did society pay a price by setting a
criminal free. Such exclusions allow the Court to display high rhetoric,
while exacting a low or non-existent cost: they do not call on the
Court to truly reconcile crime control and due process. They instead
enable the Supreme Court to avoid the head-on confrontation be-
tween the two. The Court can display lofty ideals of procedural justice
without appearing soft on crime.
Given the publicity that Elzam received due to the defendant's
mysterious death, the Court's procedural justice was further ampli-
fied, albeit in a misleading fashion. In Lawrence Friedman's words,
acquitting a man post-mortem has great "propaganda value," provid-
ing at least the appearance of "meticulous justice."' 29 To the average
newspaper reader, the system might appear "obsessed with the rights
of defendants,"'3 ° insisting on delivering due process even beyond the
grave. I doubt, however, that the Court would have reached the same
result had the defendant still been alive. The data suggests otherwise.
Yet the State Attorney's Office was still concerned about Elzam's
force as a binding interpretation of Issacharov. It petitioned to have
the case reconsidered by a broader panel of the Supreme Court based
on the ruling's precedential importance and innovation.'31 In his peti-
tion, the State Attorney argued that Elzam shifted the balance estab-
lished under Issacharov when giving insufficient, or no consideration
to the social costs of excluding the evidence. Factors such as retribu-
tion, the severity of the crime, the need to uncover the truth and to
purpose in appealing his son's conviction-clearing his son's name. See Tomer Zarhin, In A
Rare Move A Father Appealed His Deceased Son's Conviction for Murder, HAARETZ, May 20,
2008, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/985245.html
128. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] 5, reprinted in 2006(1)
Isr. L. Rep. 320, 333. Issacharov was sentenced to two months probation for a year and a half;
but his appeal took six years, by which point his probation had expired. Id. Arguably, acquitting
him in such a high profile decision did more to harm his reputation than leaving the conviction
for possession and use of marijuana in place. We might also recall that he was still convicted of
possession, which meant that he would continue to suffer from the ramifications of having a
criminal conviction.
129. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT I1 AMERICAN HISTORY 257 (1993).
130. Id. at 258.
131. DNP 6341/09 State of Israel v. The Estate of Elzam [2009] (unpublished).
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maintain the public's faith in the criminal legal system allegedly got
short shrift.'3 2  In dismissing the State's petition, Chief Justice
Beinisch held that Issacharov had provided only general guidelines
while leaving the actual application to broad judicial discretion on a
case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances. 133
The "special circumstances" of the case 134 persuaded the majority that
the evidence should be excluded and the defendant acquitted. But
this particular application of Issacharov's guidelines to the concrete
facts of the individual case, Beinisch wrote, did not fundamentally al-
ter or restate the considerations relevant to exclusion or the proper
balance between them; it therefore did not justify rehearing. 135
Nevertheless, cynics might argue that the "circumstances" that
rendered exclusion and the acquittal sound, and were alluded to so
frequently but never specifically in the Chief Justice's ruling, were the
defendant's death. In dismissing the State's petition, the Chief Justice
seemed to reassure the State Attorney that Elzam was a truly unusual
case. It seems likely that Elzam's passing emboldened the Court to be
so uncharacteristically nonchalant about acquitting a murder suspect
in a case involving prominent organized crime figures.
D. The Relation Between the Violation and the Evidence
We now come to the interpretation of Issacharov's second prong:
the relation between the violation and the evidence. A central factor
under this heading is the "independence" of the evidence, including
what Kitai and Merin have considered a misreading of the Canadian
conscription test and the distinction between real and testimonial evi-
dence. The confusion in the Supreme Court's reasoning is reflected-
and has been amplified-in the lower courts.
1. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree or the Forbidden Fruit Itself?
Since Issacharov, lower courts have seized on Issacharov's distinc-
tion between real and testimonial evidence-and the reliability test
132. Id. 4. In addition, the State Attorney argued that the decision in Elzam unjustifiably
curtailed the use of active undercover agents: it limited their ability to encourage a suspect to
forgo his right to silence and confess. See id. 1 5.
133. Id. 6.
134. Justice Beinisch mentioned the term "circumstances," in varying combinations ("cir-
cumstance based discretion"; "the special and particular circumstances of the case"; "the totality
of the circumstances," etc.), eight times in only two paragraphs. See id. 1$ 6-7.
135. Id. 7.
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therein-to dismiss motions to suppress real evidence.136 Some
judges have gone as far as fundamentally misstating Issacharov's hold-
ing, asserting that physical evidence should never be excluded. To
support this proposition, judges have cited the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of the American "remedial approach" and of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.1 37 But when doing so, lower courts often
misstate the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, its rationale, and
its application: 138 citing the Supreme Court's rejection of the Ameri-
can doctrine, lower courts have admitted not only the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree, but the forbidden fruit itself, those objects found in the
course of the unlawful search. Real evidence in almost all cases has
been admitted, and in the few cases where it was excluded at the trial
court level, the decision was often reversed on appeal. 139 These read-
ings further distort Issacharov's already debatable holding, which
deemed real evidence more likely to be admitted due to its inherent
reliability.
Despite scholarly critique and the evident confusion among
lower-court judges, the Supreme Court has done little to clarify or
correct the real/testimonial distinction or to elucidate the other inde-
pendence tests: of the 28 rulings in which the Supreme Court revisited
136. Crim App (TA) 7250/09 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] 21 (unpublished). The
district court explained that reliability is the primary concern under this prong. "The nature of
the evidence obtained bears on this consideration [the influence of the violation on the evidence
obtained] and we should distinguish between an incriminatory statement by a suspect following
an illegal investigation-due to the fear that improper means might influence the credibility and
veracity of the statement-and physical evidence, that stands independently, as an objective
piece of evidence." (Then citing the relevant part of Issacharov). See also CrimA (TA) State of
Israel v. Kasser (unpublished), separate opinion by Judge Kara. For similar approaches in the
magistrates' courts see Crim (TA) 2745/08 State of Israel v. Hilwani [2000] T 2 (unpublished);
Crim (Ramle) 5568/06 State of Israel v. Karimov [2008] 10(g) (unpublished).
137. See Crim (TA) 1086/08 State of Israel v. Salah [2008] 20 (unpublished). In the deci-
sion, Judge Naor concluded "I need not answer this question [of whether consent may have
deemed the search legal] given the Supreme Court's explicit ruling in Issacharov concerning the
admissibility of physical evidence found during the course of an illegal search." Id. For a similar
misstatement of Issacharov and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine, see Crim (BS) 1519/06
State of Israel v. Sabag [2008] C (unpublished); Crim (Ramle) 5568/06 State of Israel v.
Karimov [2008] 10(G) (unpublished).
138. Id. For a discussion and explanation of the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" doctrine and
its rationale see WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 45, at 39. As the authors explain, typical
situations for applying the doctrine are when the police have conducted a search or detained the
suspect without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The question is whether
a subsequent confession, given after proper Miranda warnings, should nevertheless be excluded.
Id. at 39-41. This is not at all the case which Israeli courts were facing when addressing the
physical findings of an indisputably illegal search.
139. See Crim A (TA) 7250/09 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] (unpublished); CrimA
(TA) 70490/08 State of Israel v. Kasser [2009] (unpublished); Crim (Hadera) 1287/08 State of
Israel v. Abu Moch [2010].
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Issacharov, only one-the Almagor ruling14 0 provided any kind of
in-depth analysis of how to address real evidence.14 1 In that case, it
was exclusively the evidence's independence and physicality that car-
ried the decision not to suppress. In Almagor, the defendant was
charged with arson, murder, and attempted murder. 42 The prosecu-
tion's case relied heavily on burns found on the defendant's body and
a burnt shirt discovered in his apartment. Expert testimony estab-
lished that the shirt was exposed to extremely high temperatures for a
short period of time, 43 which ruled out the defendant's claim that the
fibers had been scorched during ironing. 44 More importantly, the
scorched shirt further undermined the defendant's claim that burns on
his body were the result of extended exposure to the sun, since the
shirt's scorching coincided with the location of his skin burns.145 Al-
though the evidence was mostly circumstantial, joined with the defen-
dant's lies and his motive they were found sufficient to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 46
Still, the search that uncovered the burnt shirt was deemed un-
lawful: despite his request, the defendant's attorney was not informed,
violating the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel.147 The Su-
preme Court nevertheless affirmed that the shirt was rightly admitted
by the trial court.1 48 Although Justice Naor found that the police
could offer no convincing reason for not alerting the defendant's law-
yer, and were evasive when asked about the matter, she still deemed
the evidence admissible. 49 Wrapping three rationales into one, hing-
ing primarily on the physicality and reliability of the proof, Naor
based her decision exclusively on the second prong of Issacharov-the
relation between the illegality and the evidence: the evidence would
have been discovered even had the defense attorney been informed;
140. CrimA 9897/05 Almagor v. State of Israel [2006] (unpublished).
141. Requests for certiorari, mainly in knife-possession cases, have typically been dismissed.
See, e.g., A.Cr.A. 8831/09 Kasser v. State of Israel [20091 (unpublished). But Ben Haim is sched-
uled for hearing.
142. CrimA 9897/05 Almagor v. State of Israel [2006] (unpublished).
143. Id. 4.
144. Id. 11.
145. Id. 4. The defendant's explanation that his burns were caused by extended exposure
to the sun seem to have already been discredited even without the shirt in evidence: the defen-
dant displayed burns on the soles of his feet, which the experts opined-and the district court
agreed-was an unusual place for a sun burn. The prosecution's experts testified that the defen-
dant's claim that the burns were aggravated by rubbing alcohol, were unlikely. See id. 3.
146. Id. T 7.
147. Id. 11.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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rejecting the defendant's claim that the shirt was planted by the po-
lice, the Court ruled that the shirt existed independently of the po-
lice's violation of the defendant's rights; and as real evidence, the shirt
was particularly reliable. 150 The Court ended its analysis there, with-
out considering how the other prongs of Issacharov might affect the
equation. Still one can glean from the decision that the police acted in
bad faith, that the violation could have been easily avoided, and the
violation was considered serious. As we can see in this ruling too, the
second prong of Issacharov seems to control in cases where real evi-
dence is obtained.
2. Testimonial Evidence: Causation and the Burden of Proving
It
One of the questions that Issacharov left unresolved was the
causal link required to trigger exclusion.15' The dataset indicates that
even when the police's failure to comply with the law has been firmly
proved, courts tend to insist on a clear and unambiguous causal rela-
tion between the violation and the evidence obtained. 52 Defendants
seeking exclusion of their statements are essentially required to prove
a negative counterfactual: not only must it be shown that the defen-
dant was not properly warned, but also that he was unaware of his
rights and that had he been properly informed he would have behaved
substantially different.'53 We should note that the Israeli approach
stands in sharp contrast to the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Miranda.'54
150. Id.
151. Id. 11 64, at 79.
152. Though the courts often do not analyze this causal relation under the second prong, but
rather as a preliminary question of whether or not Issacharov should even apply.
153. See, e.g., Crim (Hadera) 1127/07 State of Israel v. Moskovitzi [2007] 91 16 (unpublished).
This standard has been adopted by judges who have actually excluded evidence as well. See
Crim (Jer.) 2549/07 State of Israel v. Gabai at 23 (unpublished) where the court reasoned that
the defendants confession should be excluded since he had remained silent after consulting his
attorney.
154. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, at 468-69 (1966):
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule,
and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege
so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was
aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the
defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or
prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clear-
cut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warn-
ing at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to
insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.
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The strict approach that Israeli courts have applied towards cau-
sation draws attention away from the police's failure to abide by the
law. Instead, it focuses on the defendant's failure to exercise his rights
even though he was aware of them. The defendant's presumed aware-
ness of his rights has typically been sufficient reason to deny motions
to exclude; failure to assert rights one was aware of is not attributed to
the police's omissions and therefore need not result in suppression of
evidence.
Sound as this line of reasoning may be, courts have gone on to
rely on debatable presumptions to prove defendants' awareness of
their rights. Discoverability has been stretched to its outer limits. The
Israeli Supreme Court has affirmed that prior contact with authorities
may establish the defendant's knowledge. 155 Courts have shown little
interest in the nature of the previous encounter and whether it gave
the defendant a chance to inform himself. Serving as an expert wit-
ness in a civil proceeding has been considered ample opportunity to
learn one's rights as a criminal defendant. 56 The assumption that the
recidivist-defendant as a "repeat player" knows the law stands in
sharp contrast to the courts' expectations from the police, as we shall
soon see.
Even defendants with no prior experience with the police have
been assumed to know their rights as suspects. Issacharov's facts have
proven usefully distinguishable when formulating such presumptions:
in contrasting the case before him from Issacharov, one judge noted
that unlike Private Issacharov, the defendant was not an inexperi-
155. See CrimA 1094/07 Dadon v. State of Israel [2008] 21 (unpublished). Justice Rubin-
stein writes:
We must also remember that the defendant has had ample experience in the criminal
field, the police world, and the ways of prosecution and defense and is therefore unlike
a person who encounters criminal proceedings and arrest for the first time and is there-
fore 'shell shocked' and we must take this as well into account.
See also CrimA 7033/04 Yair v. State of Israel [2006] $ 11 (unpublished).
156. See Crim (HI) 219/03 State of Israel v. Ta'anach [2006] 1 74, at 67 (unpublished). The
defendants were real estate appraisers. From the decision it does not appear that they had any
prior experience with the criminal legal system. Nevertheless, the court found that based on
their profession, they must have been aware of their rights as criminal defendants. The court
wrote:
Defendants 1, 3 and 4 claim that they were not informed of their right to an attorney...
We are dealing with defendants for whom courts are not foreign. They all submitted
appraisals over the years that were subject to court review and it may be assumed that
they were also examined in court. Helef and Shachar [two of the defendants] even con-
ducted proceedings against the commission. It seems reasonable to me that they were
aware of their right to an attorney. In any event, it has not been proved that this was not
the case.
(emphasis added). As we can see, the burden in such cases is placed on the defendant to prove
he was unaware of his rights, rather than settling for proof that he was not informed of his rights.
[Vol. 16
"EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, YOU EXCLUDE JUSTICE"?
enced youth but an adult woman who knew-or perhaps should have
known-her rights.157
Even when the defendant's counterfactual claims seem plausible,
courts still tend to sever the causal links between the violation and the
testimonial evidence obtained. Early breaches in the investigation can
be cured through later compliance with protocol.158 As we have seen
in Mubarack, although the defendant was severely and systematically
abused at the beginning of his interrogation, the causal relations be-
tween the violations and his statement were disjoined by later provid-
ing him with adequate conditions.' 59 The district court gave little
consideration to the cumulative effects that several days of harsh in-
terrogation and abuse might have. And even if later compliance is
believed to have severed all causal links, in cases of such brutal abuse
judicial integrity is still implicated when courts do not dissociate them-
selves from such brutal police behavior.'60
Another way that courts have avoided exclusion has been by
finding that the defendant would not have remained silent or con-
sulted an attorney even had he been properly warned. This
counterfactual may be sufficiently proved by showing that the defen-
157. Crim (Hadera) 1127/07 State of Israel v. Moskovitzi [2007] 16 (unpublished). The fact
that the defendant did not take the stand was held against her, since it did not allow the court to
establish whether or not she would have behaved differently had she been warned. This means
that if a defendant would like to challenge the authority's failure to inform her and show that she
in fact did not know her rights, she must waive the right not to testify. This seems like a ques-
tionable outcome. See also CrimC (BS) 992/02 State of Israel v. Juabra [2007] 6 (unpublished).
For a similar approach, which places the burden on the defendant to prove that he would have
behaved differently had he been informed of his rights see Crim (Jer) 2065/06 State of Israel v.
Wallace [2008].
158. See, e.g., Crim (TA) 40033/07 State of Israel v. Abu Assa [2008] 14, at 27-28 (unpub-
lished). The court admitted the defendant's statements even though some of them were ob-
tained without proper warning of his right to silence, to an attorney, or in some cases both.
Furthermore, it appeared that defendant's counsel was denied access to his client without proper
authorization or documentation. Id. at 27. Until the fourth statement there was no documenta-
tion that the defendant was informed of his right to an attorney at all. Id. at 14. The court
nevertheless ruled that the statements should be admitted since the defendant's fundamental
rights were honored, "albeit not fully." The court also noted that Issacharov dealt with an easy
case, and although this was not deemed a "hard" case, it nevertheless did not justify exclusion.
Id. at 28.
159. CrimC (TA) 1060/07 State of Israel v. Mubarack [2008] H, at 31, 40 (unpublished).
The district court also made much of the fact that the defendant said, immediately after the
confession, that he confessed to clear his conscience, meaning that it was not the abuse that
caused him to confess. Id. at 44-45.
160. Courts have also held that the exclusionary rule should apply only to confessions ob-
tained in violation of the defendant's rights. Statements denying involvement, though used by
the prosecution to impeach, have been deemed admissible and unaffected by the exclusionary
rule. See CrimA 1250/07 Abu Sulab v. State of Israel [2007] 7.
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dant did not exercise his rights even after being informed of them. 161
In Wallace the court took this logic a step further, reasoning by anal-
ogy: since the defendant did not choose to remain silent although
warned of that right, he probably would not have consulted an attor-
ney even if told of the possibility. 162 His statement was therefore
deemed admissible.
Perhaps the high water mark of the courts' approach towards
causation was the Belfer decision, which held that consulting an attor-
ney would not have changed Belfer's defense. That police actively
misled the defendant and told her that she may not meet with her
attorney prior to questioning therefore did not warrant exclusion of
her statement. 163  Although Belfer seemed to meet even the most
stringent causal requirements between the police's violation and the
defendant's course of action, the target continued to move, requiring
yet another layer of causality: a link between the police's violation and
the defendant's defense at trial. Belfer's failed motion to exclude
brings into focus a broader phenomenon: rather than considering the
right to counsel to be a fundamental entitlement of the accused-with
a corresponding obligation by the authorities to properly inform Bel-
fer of this right-the court deemed her right relative. Since the court
knew Belfer to be guilty, as proved by the fact that she could not have
raised another defense, that she was actively misled no longer mat-
161. See Crim (TA) 40033/07 State of Israel v. Abu Assa [2008] 14, at 27-28 (unpublished).
See also Crim (Naz.) 4813/05 State of Israel v. Dekel Concrete Ltd. [2009] 32 (unpublished),
where the court held that although the defendant was not warned of his rights, this did not affect
the credibility of his statement, as proved by his repetition and elaboration upon his initial state-
ment after consulting his lawyer.
162. Crim (Jer) 2065/06 State of Israel v. Wallace [2008 1 29, at 53-54 (unpublished): "In
addition, it is unclear that had the defendant been informed of his right to an attorney he would
have stopped the investigation for this purpose, just as he did not make use of his right to remain
silent which according to him could have helped him avoid any incriminatory or other state-
ments." Id. at 29.
163. See Crim (TA) 40123/06 State of Israel v. Belfer [2007], at 14-15 (unpublished). Police
informed the defendant of her right to inform her attorney and meet with him, but when the
defendant asked to speak to her attorney after hearing the warning she was told she could not
and that she would be questioned without her lawyer present. Id. at 14. She inquired: "An
interrogation without an attorney?" to which the interrogator responded: "That is how it works."
Id. Nevertheless, the court held that the evidence should not be excluded because it did not
constitute a "substantial violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial." To prove such a viola-
tion, the defendant would have to show that had she consulted an attorney she would have
emphasized different facts or aspects during her questioning. The court concluded that the mis-
take probably stemmed from the interrogator's lack of experience rather than from malice, an
issue I address in detail in the following section. In a similar ruling, the Tel Aviv district court
held that although the police unlawfully denied the defendant access to counsel, his statement
should not be excluded because his attorney would have advised him to claim self-defense, as he
in fact did. See Crim (TA) 40342/05 State of Israel v. Shulman [2008 1 45 (unpublished).
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tered. This approach that subordinates procedural rights to accurate
outcomes rather than considering procedural justice an independent
end will be further analyzed below.
E. Severity of the Violation
We come now to the question of the severity of the violation.
Among other factors, courts are asked to consider the significance of
the rights violated, the police's state of mind in acting or omitting, and
the presence of extenuating circumstances. As we shall see, each of
these considerations has bred problematic applications.
1. Ignorantia Legis Neminem Excusat?'64 On Good Faith and
Bad Cops
Recall Issacharov's distinction between intentionally and know-
ingly violating the law on the one hand, and doing so in good faith on
the other.'65 But between these two extremes lie a range of behaviors
that were not specifically addressed in the ruling. Most notably the
entire category of negligence was not specifically discussed. There-
fore, how negligence factors into motions to exclude is particularly
telling; it offers insight into how courts perceive state powers, the au-
thorities' obligations towards suspects and the judges' confidence in
the police force.
The Court in Issacharov did not spell out how it might consider
the police's claim that they were unaware of the relevant law and their
violation of it. Especially given judicial rulings that repeat offenders
are presumed to know their rights as suspects, one would assume that
repeat law enforcers would be held to similar, if not higher standards.
But since Issacharov, a number of courts have held that police's
ignorance or misunderstanding of the law might weigh against exclu-
sion, because they lack actual malice or bad faith.166 For example, in
more than one instance police's unawareness that they may not rely
164. "Ignorantia legis nemimen excusat" is translated as "ignorance of law excuses no one."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990)
165. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] 70. The Court held,
however, that the fact that the authorities acted in good faith will not necessarily mean that the
evidence should not be excluded: if the violation was severe, i.e. of a fundamental right, good
faith will not suffice. Id. at 70.
166. See Crim (Safed) 1596/06 State of Israel v. Karako [2006] 1 24-25 (unpublished), where
the police failed to inform the defendant of his right to an attorney. In response to questioning
during trial, the officer replied that she was "not instructed to act in accordance with the case
law." The court found that this ignorance-or lack of guidance by superiors-established the
officer's lack of malice, thus favoring admission.
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on an individual's status as a known habitual criminal to conduct a
search was held insufficiently malicious to justify exclusion. 167 Physi-
cally forcing a defendant to spit out a bag of marijuana has also been
excused on similar grounds.168 While deeming the search illegal and
scathingly rebuking the police's behavior, 69 the court still admitted
the evidence. 170 Judge Tsur found that the police did not know that
they acted against the law and had acted in a similar fashion in the
past. 171 Hence, that police acted out of habit-albeit an illegal one-
weighed towards admission.'
72
A particularly striking rulings under this heading is Metodi, in
which a French national was charged with extortion and money laun-
dering.173 When the defendant asked why counsel was not present at
his questioning, he was informed that he could not see his lawyer until
after his preliminary interrogation. 74 He was not, however, told that
he may remain silent until then. 75 When asked by the court why he
misled the defendant, the interrogator responded that he understood
the law to be SO. 17 6 Although the court found that had Metodi been
properly warned he most likely would not have spoken at that point,
thereby meeting even the stringent causal link requirement, it held
that the police's absence of malice, combined with the credibility of
167. Crim (TA) 8713/07 State v. Zarka [2008] at 4 (refer to "conclusion") (unpublished). See
also Crim (BS) 1519/06 State of Israel v. Sabag A (unpublished). "In this case I am under the
impression that the breach was not intentional, as it appears from the policeman's testimony that
he believed that the search was legal, especially since the defendant agreed to it." Id.
168. Crim (Jer.) 4992/05 State of Israel v. Buaziz [2007] 12 (unpublished). The defendant
claimed that the policemen choked him to force the drugs out of his mouth. Police denied the
allegation, claiming that they did no more than apply mild pressure to his cheeks. The court
believed the police, but still deemed this an illegal search and ordered that a copy of the decision
be passed to prison authorities. The circumstances of this search seem quite similar to the facts
Collins case, which discussed the legality of the "throat hold." See R. v. Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R.
265, 1 1-2 (Can.).
169. Id. 14. Judge Tzur classified this search an "external search" in the defendant's body,
comparable to collecting a saliva sample. Such a search requires the defendant's consent or a
police officer's written authorization after the suspect is afforded a hearing. Such authorization
allows the police to use reasonable force to conduct the search. See Criminal Procedure Law
(Enforcement Powers - Body Search of Suspect) § 3(C)-(D) (Isr.).
170. Id. 1 18.
171. In fact, the policemen testified that this was standard practice. Id. 14.
172. Crim (Jer) 4992/05 State of Israel v. Buaziz [2007 1 16 (unpublished). Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the court did not lean on the fact that the evidence was physical when deciding to admit it.
See id.
173. Crim 40186/07 State of Israel v. Metodi (January 19, 2007 ruling on motion to exclude
statements) (unpublished) [2007].
174. Id $ 42.
175. Id. 43.
176. Id. 42.
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the defendant's statements and the severity of the crime deemed his
confession admissible. a77
This questionable approach might be the result of the Supreme
Court's adamant insistence that exclusion not rest on a desire to deter
or educate the police. 78 Still, in admitting such evidence, courts have
not only failed to deter but have created an incentive for police to not
educate themselves, because doing so might deny them a valuable de-
fense of ignorance or negligence. And just as ignorance of the law is
not a defense in criminal law-and has not served defendants who
have claimed ignorance of their rights as suspects-it should not serve
the state as an argument against exclusion. To hold otherwise is to
further compromise judicial integrity. Even assuming that the police
are genuinely unaware, a judicial approach that favors admission in
such cases legitimizes police's ignorance and makes courts complicit in
the authorities' disregard for the law.
Implicit in the asymmetry between suspects' and police's obliga-
tions to know the law is a high measure of judicial deference towards
the police. Judges operate under a strong presumption that the police
act in conformity with the law, a questionable premise given the data.
And even when a violation has been firmly proved, judges seem only
too ready to accept that it was unintentional, and therefore should not
trigger exclusion. Courts appear overly credulous of police's claims of
ignorance. Rather than treating police's claims with suspicion and
presuming malice when a defendant's rights are violated, courts apply
something akin to a presumption of regularity, a doctrine of adminis-
trative law that becomes particularly problematic when applied to the
criminal context.
179
177. Id. 47 (a)-(e).
178. In Issacharov itself, Justice Grunis in his dissent questioned the wisdom of taking into
account the intent of the particular police officer given that the purpose is not deterrence. See
CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] reprinted in 2006(1) Isr. L. Rep.
320 (Grunis, J., dissenting, 9, at 442).
179. Under the presumption of regularity the government is presumed to be acting lawfully
absent evidence to the contrary. For a discussion of this presumption and the obstacles it poses
to those who wish to challenge administrative actions see Itzhak Zamir, Evidence in the Adminis-
trative Courts, 1 LAW AND GOVERNMENT 297-302 (1993). The application of such a presumption
in criminal cases is particularly problematic. It seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
holding concerning the burden of proving that a confession was "free and voluntary." The Court
has held that the defendant need only claim that a confession was coerced to force the prosecu-
tion to prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. See DN 3081/91 Kozli v. State of Israel
[1991], IsrSC 45(4) 441, at 446. In so holding the Supreme Court seems to presume irregularity,
which must be convincingly contradicted.
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2. Applying Issacharov Retroactively
A related matter is the exclusion of evidence collected unlawfully
before Issacharov. The Court in Issacharov specifically held that the
new doctrine would apply immediately, even to pending proceed-
ings. 180 Yet some courts-including the Supreme Court-have still
deliberated over whether the parties could invoke Issacharov in cases
investigated before the Supreme Court created the new exclusionary
rule. One court has in fact dismissed a motion to exclude on those
grounds.181 But non-retroactive application of the exclusionary rule
could be justified only if the Supreme Court accepted deterrence as
the sole purpose of exclusion, in which case the police may be entitled
to a warning regarding the new sanction. The Court however rejected
deterrence as a rationale in Issacharov. Moreover, rejecting motions
to suppress as retroactive applications of Issacharov is internally in-
consistent: if lssacharov does not apply to cases investigated before it
was decided, the Supreme Court could not have excluded the evi-
dence in Issacharov itself.
This line of reasoning is also contrary to another method that
some courts have employed to eschew the exclusionary rule: some ap-
pellate courts have reasoned that the parties-although they com-
plained during trial and appeal of illegal and abusive practices by the
police-had not specifically raised an Issacharov (or Issachaorv-style)
objection, or had not laid down the requisite factual basis. 182 In one
such case, the appeal to the Supreme Court was submitted and oral
arguments were heard before Issacharov was decided. Yet rather than
180. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] 78, reprinted in
2006(1) Isr. L. Rep. 320, 430.
181. See, e.g., CrimA 70062/08 (TA) Sabko v. State of Israel [2009] 32-33(A) [2009] (un-
published). The district court avoided the Issacharov question by pointing out that the investiga-
tion had taken place before the ruling. Since in allowing exclusion Issacharov had created new
law and not merely interpreted existing statute, it could not apply retroactively to investigations
that had already taken place. This even though the duty to inform the defendant of his rights
existed beforehand. The Supreme Court has been somewhat more cautious and ambiguous on
this question, though the Justices have done little to disabuse lower courts of the notion that
Issacharov does not apply to investigations conducted before it was handed down. For example,
Justice Naor assumed-though only arguendo-that the defendant could have raised an objec-
tion to an illegal search conducted before Issacharov, thus suggesting that it was not clear that
the doctrine even applies. See CrimA 9897/05 Almagor v. State of Israel [2006] 11 (unpub-
lished). Similarly, Justice Levi raised the question of whether or not the doctrine applies, and
also assumed only arguendo that it did. See CrimA 8332/05 Isaacov v. State of Israel [2007] 23
(unpublished). The evidence was admitted in both cases. But see Justice Hayut in CrimA 1301/
06 Elzam v. Israel [2009 1 3 (unpublished), with Crim (Jer.) 2647/06 State of Israel v. Badaria 1
17(c) (unpublished), which was investigated and decided by the District Court before Issacharov.
182. CrimA 3796/04 Tukalia v. State of Israel [2007] 1 5 (unpublished).
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remanding, or requesting written pleadings on the applicability of Is-
sacharov, the Supreme Court dismissed the issue because the parties
had not raised it.183 But before Issacharov, trial judges likely would
have dismissed this entire line of argument and inquiry as immaterial,
unless the police's behavior bore on the reliability of a confession or
deemed it not to be "free and voluntary." And if the evidence was
physical, there was nothing in existing Israeli statute or case law that
would have supported a motion to suppress. 184
The alert reader will also note that the latter line of reasoning
contradicts the former dismissal on grounds of retroactivity. We just
saw that appellate courts asked lawyers to anticipate and raise the Is-
sacharov objection and present evidence of unlawful behavior before
the doctrine was created. But if the doctrine does not apply retroac-
tively defense counsel still could not have raised it.
Although Issacharov's retroactive application is only a transi-
tional question, that will inevitably disappear over time, it is sympto-
matic of a broader phenomenon: it illustrates the judicial
resourcefulness in avoiding the exclusionary rule.
183. See CrimA 3097/04 Suissa v. State of Israel [2006 1 30 (unpublished decision). The
defendants were convicted of conspiracy, armed robbery, and murder. Id. at 1 1. The appeal
was submitted in 2004. Oral arguments before the Supreme Court were heard on January 30,
2006, three months before Issacharov was handed down. The case was decided on October 25,
2006. It had been convincingly proved that the defendant's lawyer was not allowed access to his
client for ten days, from his hearing on January 1, 2002 until his next hearing on January 10, 2002.
The Court found that there was no justification for denying the defendant access to counsel
during that time. The defendant confessed on January 8, 2002. See id. 27. The Court never-
theless analyzed the case only under Article 12 of the Evidence Ordinance, under the rubric of
whether the confession could be considered "free and voluntary." Justice Jubran ruled that he
would not analyze the case under the new exclusionary rule since the parties did not raise such
an objection and did not provide the necessary factual basis. Id. 30. Setting aside for a mo-
ment whether the Court was correct in ruling that a defendant denied access to their attorney for
ten days should be deemed to have "freely and voluntarily" confessed, one wonders why Justice
Jubran decided to avoid the Issacharov question simply because the parties had not raised this
not-yet-created doctrine. One might also wonder what additional facts are needed to trigger the
exclusionary rule, given that it had been proved that the defendant was denied access to counsel
for an extended period of time without proper justification. Justice Jubran employed similar
reasoning in CrimA 7033/04 Yair v. State of Israel [2006] 12 (unpublished), though there he
ruled that even had the confessions been excluded under Issacharov, there still would have been
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant based on circumstantial evidence and his later state-
ments. The decision does not specify when oral arguments were heard, but Justice Jubran men-
tions that the case was pleaded a few days before Issacharov. Id. 11.
See also CrimA 3796/04 Tukalia v. The State of Israel [2007] 5 (unpublished decision). On
appeal the defendant raised a claim that he was not warned of his rights. In dicta, the Supreme
Court rejected this claim since it was only raised on appeal and no factual basis had been estab-
lished before the lower court.
184. Sangero, supra note 38, at 95.
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3. High Tolerance: What Is a Severe Breach of the
Defendant's Rights?
In the three-and-a-half years since Issacharov, Israeli courts have
continued to display relatively high tolerance for police breaches of
the law. When analyzing unlawful searches and seizures, courts have
set a high bar in defining what constitutes a breach severe enough to
warrant exclusion. Frisks or searches conducted without reasonable
suspicion (let alone probable cause) have typically not been deemed
sufficiently intrusive to justify suppression. In Ben Haim,'85 the de-
fendant was stopped at 8:15 a.m. while walking on a main street in Tel
Aviv and asked to present his national identification card.1 86 A search
in the system indicated that Ben Haim was not wanted by authorities
but he did have prior convictions (the nature of which the police tact-
fully did not disclose to the court due to rules controlling character
evidence). 87 The police could not point to any particularized reason
for suspecting the defendant but nevertheless ordered him to empty
his pockets, where the police officers discovered a knife. 8
On appeal, the Tel Aviv District Court reversed Judge Mor's deci-
sion to suppress the knife. The district court raised doubts whether
the armed policemens' "request" that the defendant empty his pock-
185. CrimA (TA) 7250/09 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] (unpublished). On December
21, 2009, the Supreme Court ordered the Attorney General respond to Ben Haim's request for
certiorari. This might indicate that the Supreme Court will hear the case. See A.Cr.A 10141/09
Ben Haim v. State of Israel [2009] (unpublished).
186. It is evident from many of the cases analyzed that the police often initiate contact with
individuals by requesting a form of identification. Under the current interpretation of Israeli
law, the police and military need not have probable cause or even reasonable suspicion against a
particular individual to request to see his documents. All legal residents over the age of 16 must
carry a national identification card and must present it to a soldier or policeperson upon de-
mand. See Identity Certificate (Possessing and Presenting) Law, 5743-1982, 37 LSI 19 (1948-89)
(Isr.). Those who are not permanent residents must present a formal document that includes
their name and photograph. Though not unique to Israel, this requirement does set it apart from
its imagined community of common law jurisdictions, where such initiatives have been quite
controversial. Post 9/11 government initiatives to mandate such cards in Canada, Australia and
the UK, often justified by reference to national security, have been delayed, scaled back or
abandoned. For analysis of the debate in the United Kingdom, see UK's National ID Cards
Unveiled, BBC NEws, July 30, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8175139.stm (last visited Feb. 27,
2010); No2ID.net, About the ID Scheme, http://www.no2id.net/IDSchemes/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2010); HomeOffice.gov.uk, Why We Need Identity Cards, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/pass-
ports-and-immigration/id-cards/why-we-need-id-cards/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
For a discussion of the Canadian debate, see Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic
(University of Ottowa), http://www.cippic.ca/national-id-cards/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). For
Australia, see Electronic Frontiers Australia, Access Card/National ID Card, http://
www.efa.org.auflssues/Privacy/accesscard.html (last visited (Feb. 27, 2010).
187. Crim (TA) 6454/07 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] 3 (unpublished).
188. Id.
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ets even amounted to a "search" since the officers did not actually
touch the defendant.'89 Although police testified that had the defen-
dant refused they would have taken him to the police station for a
search, 9 ' the district court still pondered whether the search might be
deemed consensual, and therefore legal. 9' But assuming arguendo
that this was in fact a search-and an illegal one at that-the court
held that it was insufficiently intrusive to warrant exclusion. 192 Citing
its decision in Kasser,193 a post-Issacharov case dealing with similar
circumstances, the district court contrasted such searches with more
intrusive searches, such as strip-searching or taking bodily samples. In
comparison, the pocket search was deemed a minor infraction not
warranting suppression. This line of reasoning has been adopted in
other cases as well.' 9 4
Although strip and bodily searches are surely more intrusive than
a search of someone's pockets, one wonders whether exclusion should
be reserved for instances where the police engage in such extreme
violations of the law and of the right to privacy. To insist on such a
narrow reading of the exclusionary rule seems to allow police great
latitude in harassing citizens in public spaces without proper grounds.
There is evidence beyond my sample that suggests the police are do-
189. CrimA (TA) 7250/09 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] 20 (unpublished)
190. Crim (TA) 6454/07 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] 5 (unpublished).
191. CrimA (TA) 7250/09 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] 12 (unpublished). Since the
defendant opted not to testify, the district court rejected the lower court's presumption that Ben
Haim did not know his rights and that had he been informed of them he would have refused the
search. The district court held that "the court cannot make factual presumptions in favor of the
defendant." Id. 1 12. One wonders why such presumptions can be made in favor of the police
but not of the defendant. Furthermore, the court suggested that the defendant may be presumed
to know the law. Id. This stands in sharp contrast to the district court's holding-in that same
decision-that the police did not intentionally break the law, which weighed in favor of admit-
ting the evidence. See id. 1 20.
192. In CrimA (TA) 7250/09 State of Israel v. Ben Haim [2009] (unpublished), the Tel Aviv
District Court on appeal held that evidence obtained in an illegal search (assuming that the
search was in fact illegal) should not be excluded because the defendant was not subject to the
searches enumerated in the Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Authorities - Suspect Body
Search). Id. 1 20. That law, in § 1, distinguishes external and internal bodily searches. The
former include visual examination of a suspect's naked body; prints of any part of defendant's
body; fingernails; samples of suspect's nostrils, hair, urine, saliva, skin, breath, or cheek cells.
"Internal searches" include blood, x-ray, and gynecological exams. A similar approach was ex-
pressed in CrimA 70490/08 State of Israel v. Kasser [2009 1 22 (unpublished).
193. CrimA 70490/08 State of Israel v. Kasser [2009] 22. The Supreme Court declined to
grant certiorari. A.Cr.A. 8831/09 Kasser v. State of Israel [2009].
194. See Crim (Kiryat Gat) 106/06 State of Israel v. Naula [2008] 1 25, where the court ruled
that although illegal, the search was nevertheless not accompanied by violence or indignity
therefore rendering the knife found admissible; see also Crim (TA) 1086/08 State of Israel v.
Salah [2008] 26 (unpublished).
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ing precisely that: one of Israel's leading newspapers, Haaretz, re-
cently ran a series of articles about unlawful searches that are
routinely conducted by Jerusalem Police.1 95 The police also habitually
misinform individuals of their right to refuse such searches, threaten-
ing that declining to voluntarily submit may provide grounds for arrest
and search against the individual's will. 196 The individual faces a lose-
lose situation, seriously straining the police's claim of consent.
4. The Cleansing Power of Necessity and Proportionality:
Transforming Unlawful into Lawful
Issacharov held that certain "extenuating circumstances" might
mitigate a violation of the defendant's rights. That the police acted
unlawfully to prevent the destruction of crucial evidence or to protect
the public's safety and security might weigh in favor of admission.
197
According to Issacharov, although such acts remain unlawful, we
might consider the police's violations less reprehensible given the ne-
cessity they present.'98
In crafting this mitigating factor, Justice Beinisch drew on her
2002 ruling in Smirk, but slightly restated her holding in that deci-
195. Nir Hasson, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel: The Searches in Rehavia are Ille-
gal, HAARETZ, Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1i45143.html; see
also Nir Hasson, Arrests and Humiliations, HAARETZ, Feb. 5, 2010, available at http:/
www.haaretz.co.illhasite/spages/1147580.html; see also Nir Hasson, Though Reprimanded, the
Policeman Harassing Rehavia Residents Continues to Stop Passers-By, HAARETZ, Mar. 12, 2010,
available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1156022.html. These searches are being con-
ducted in Rehavia, one of Jerusalem's most prominent neighborhoods, which might explain their
coverage in the press. That these police abuses are committed in Rehavia might lead the courts
to seriously consider whether more serious action is required on their part.
196. Nir Hasson, ACRI: The Searches in Rehavia are Illegal, HAARETZ, Jan. 26, 2010, availa-
ble at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/i145143.html.
197. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] §70, reprinted in 2006(1)
Isr. L. Rep. 320, 421-23.
198. Justice Beinisch defined "unlawful means" in Issacharov as contrary to statute, regula-
tion, or a mandatory guideline or unfair measures or means that unlawfully infringe on a funda-
mental right. Id. 1 64. Issacharov suggested that these were alternative standards, with the
violation of one sufficing to deem the behavior unlawful. Although this was the stated approach
of the Court, certain statements in Issacharov make this holding somewhat more ambiguous. See
id. 1 68: "Like all fights recognized in out legal system, the right to due process is also not
absolute. The protection of it is derived from the need to balance it with competing values,
rights and interests which we have mentioned, including exposing the truth, fighting criminality,
maintaining the public peace, and protecting the rights of crime victims, both actual and poten-
tial." Id. Although ostensibly this latter test would determine whether admitting the evidence
would infringe upon the defendant's right to due process under the restriction clause of Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, but would not deem the act lawful, as we shall soon see the
two have been confounded: whether the evidence should be admitted seems to project back on
the determination of whether it was lawfully obtained.
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sion.1 99 In Smirk, Beinisch admitted the confession of a defendant
who was not warned of his right to silence or to an attorney.2 °° Smirk
was a German national who converted to Islam, joined Hezbollah and
underwent military training in Lebanon.20 1  He came to Israel on a
reconnaissance mission to seek out potential locations for a suicide
attack.20 2 Upon arrival at Ben Gurion International Airport Smirk
was detained and interrogated for 17 hours by the General Security
Service (GSS). He was then handed over to the police for further
questioning.20 3 Smirk later stood criminal trial for charges of mem-
bership in a terror organization, conspiracy to aid an enemy at war
with Israel and conspiracy to communicate information with the intent
of compromising national security.2 °4
At Smirk's criminal trial one of the main questions was whether
his initial confession to the GSS, which was obtained without warning
him of his rights, should be admissible.20 5 In deciding to admit the
confession, the Court found that the GSS acted in a preventative
rather than investigative capacity; as a result, the GSS's cognizant re-
fraining from warning the defendant was held consistent with GSS
protocol, necessary and legal. 20 6 Because the GSS's actions were justi-
fied on preventive grounds, the Court dismissed the defendant's claim
that his confession should be excluded at his criminal trial-a determi-
nation that is all but trivial. From the fact that the GSS agents in their
counterterrorism role acted out of necessity, and therefore should not
be punished, it does not inevitably follow that Smirk's right to due
199. CrimA 6613/99 Smirk v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 529.
200. Id. at 546.
201. Id. at 534-35.
202. Id. at 535.
203. Id. at 550.
204. Id. at 534.
205. Id. 1 8, at 544-46. Another question was whether the defendant's confession, which was
given after seventeen hours of ongoing interrogation, should be deemed admissible. The Court
answered in the affirmative, holding that "the defendant's exhaustion and being subject to ongo-
ing interrogation are often inevitable results or side effects of an investigation." Id. 1 11, at 551.
The Court also found that Smirk's exhaustion did not break his free will, as proved by the fact
that he refused to give his interrogators the names of his contacts in Israel. Id. In any event, the
defendant affirmed his confession the following day, after he was given ample time to rest. Id. I
11, at 552. Smirk's denial of access to counsel for 17 days raised no question of legality since it
was approved by the district court as required by law. Id. 1 15, at 553-54. Still, the defendant's
attorney argued that his client was not informed of his right to appeal the decision, nor was the
German Consulate informed of his arrest. The Supreme Court held that these omissions did not
affect the core of Smirk's right to counsel. His denial of access was reviewed by the district court
and was therefore lawful. Id. at 555.
206. Id. at 545-46.
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process as a criminal suspect was not infringed.2 °7 In related contexts,
both the Israeli Supreme Court and the House of Lords have drawn
such distinctions, distinguishing between executive and judicial
roles. 20 8 Nevertheless, in Smirk the Court linked the two, subordinat-
ing the defendant's rights as a criminal defendant to a determination
of necessity.20 9
A related observation is brought to light by comparing Smirk
with Beinisch's later interpretation of its holding in Issacharov: there
is an important difference between necessity reflecting on the author-
ity's state of mind, which still flags the act as unlawful, and ruling that
necessity deems the act legal. If necessity deems the authority's act
legal, as the Court held in Smirk, that would render the Issacharov
tests superfluous. Yet Beinisch included Smirk as one of Issacharov's
subtests, not as a preliminary question concerning legality. Con-
founding these issues tends to blur the lines between legal and illegal,
subjecting violations of defendants' rights to case-by-case proportion-
ality and necessity tests. As a result, the provisions of the criminal
procedure code might generally appear more pliable. And in fact
there seems to be good reason for such concerns.
Let us begin by considering interrogation techniques that are not
specifically outlawed by statute, yet appear to be on the fringe of what
the Supreme Court is willing to deem fair and legal. In Pilza, the de-
fendant was charged with robbery.210 The police actively misled the
207. Justice Beinisch seems to recognize this distinction in Smirk, yet when analyzing the
effect of necessity on the defendant's right to due process seems to ignore it. Id. at 545-46. Chief
Justice Barak made such a distinction in the monumental ruling in HCJ 5100/94 Public Commit-
tee Against Torture in Israel IsrSC 53(4), 817, [1999 1 23 available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/
verdictssearch/englishverdictssearch.aspx.
208. See id. See also A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71
(H.L.) (Eng.), § 70. "The executive and the judiciary have different functions and different re-
sponsibilities. It is one thing for tainted information to be used by the executive when making
operational decisions or by the police when exercising their investigatory powers, including pow-
ers of arrest... It is an altogether different matter of the judicial arm of the state to admit such
information as evidence when adjudicating definitively upon the guilt or innocence of a person
charged with a criminal offence."
209. CrimA 6613/99 Smirk v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 529, 8, at 546:
Characterizing the cases in which the absence of a warning should result in exclusion
requires a more comprehensive discussion and must be left for days to come. As
stated, in the appellant's case I am convinced that not warning him at the airport and
on his way to the GSS facility stemmed from the imminent danger posed by him upon
his arrival to Israel and the nature of the investigation, in which there was an urgent
need to receive information from him. Furthermore, I believe that the absence of a
warning did not affect his free will... Under these circumstances I do not consider the
absence of a warning to be a disproportionate infringement of the right to remain si-
lent, that requires exclusion.
210. CrimA 2939/09 Pilza v. State of Israel [2009] %$ 23-24 (unpublished).
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defendant to believe that the victim had identified him in a photo
lineup,211 which led him to confess.212 Justice Miriam Naor expressed
her discomfort with the police's behavior. She wrote that although
pre-Issacharov jurisprudence distinguished between fabricating real or
written evidence and verbally misleading the accused, deeming only
the former illegal, this distinction may no longer hold after
Issacharov.21 3
Naor still considered the police's behavior lawful in this instance
and admitted the confession.21 4 What animated her decision was the
fact that the police had already employed a number of more honest
investigation techniques that did not yield the desired evidence (in-
cluding interrogation of both defendants, questioning of eye-witnesses
and a photo lineup). Only then did they actively mislead the ac-
cused.215 According to Justice Naor, the need to obtain incriminating
evidence coupled with previous failed attempts to do so not only ren-
dered the police's acts less reprehensible, but transformed them from
unfair-and therefore unlawful-into lawful.
While Pilza operated in the realm of the vague and yet undefined
standards of investigation fairness, other decisions have whitewashed
acts that were clearly contrary to statute. In Halil,2 16 a murder suspect
was denied access to counsel for a total of 16 days without district
court approval, despite statutory requirements.21 7 Citing Smirk, the
district court held that the evidence should not be excluded: balancing
the defendant's rights on the one hand and investigation needs and
the discovery of the truth on the other, the court deemed the police
and GSS's otherwise unlawful denial of counsel reasonable.218 The
court overrode the relevant statute, while declining to subject the vio-
lation to strict scrutiny.
211. In fact, he had identified a different individual. Id.
212. Id. $ 14.
213. Id. 1$ 23-24. Justice Levi, concurring in the result, stated that he found the technique
entirely legal. Id. (Levi J., concurring).
214. Id. 1 24.
215. Id.
216. CrimC (TA) 1039/06 State of Israel v. Halil [2008] $ 87, at 46 (unpublished).
217. Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers-Arrests) 1996, § 35(10) requires dis-
trict court approval for denial of counsel lasting longer than 10 days, even in security investiga-
tions. The law also requires that the arrest be brought to the attention of a person who the
suspect requests. Nevertheless, in this case the denial of counsel lasted for 16 days, and ap-
proved only within the police and GSS with no judicial review of the decision. In its decision,
the district court did not explicitly mention the legal requirement. See id. 1 87.
218. CrimC (TA) 1039/06 State of Israel v. Halil [2008] 1 87, at 47 (unpublished).
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Hali's reasoning has not been reserved for severe crimes or
threats to national security. In Salah,219 the police stopped the defen-
dant's vehicle without reasonable suspicion other than Salah being
"known to them from their work."22 0 During their search they discov-
ered a knife in Salah's pocket.2"' Ruling that the defendant was
searched unlawfully, 22 Judge Hadassah Naor nevertheless admitted
the evidence reasoning:
I wonder how the police may address and prevent crimes.., if phys-
ical evidence such as drugs, knives, weapons or stolen property are
suppressed merely because they were found during the course of a
routine check or search of recidivists or suspects familiar to the po-
lice from their war against street crime. Under what circumstances
may a policeman, who happens upon such suspects during the
course of his work, search them or their possessions, when the con-
ditions of Article 25 of the [Criminal Procedure] Code are not met,
he has no warrant, and has no possibility within the time constraints
and given the urgency of the [search] to petition the court for a
judicial warrant?
I believe that the answer to this was given in Issacharov, where the
Court adopted a relative doctrine that allows the court discretion in
excluding evidence obtained unlawfully, taking into consideration
the particular circumstances of each case, while balancing between
competing interests, with the court ultimately determining whether
in the particular case, given the circumstances under which the ex-
hibit was obtained, admitting it at trial would substantially compro-
mise the defendant's right to due process.22 3
Distorting Issacharov's holding, Judge Naor treads dangerously
close to authorizing the police to do what they deem necessary to fight
crime, even in violation of the law. Seemingly invoking a rationale
akin to the Fourth Amendment exigency doctrine, 2 4 Naor goes a few
steps further in generally permitting the warrantless search of recidi-
vists. To some extent, Naor's rationale resembles administrative law's
219. Crim (TA) 1086/08 State of Israel v. Salah [2008] (unpublished).
220. Id. 6.
221. Id. 6, 13.
222. Id. T 19. She left open the question of whether the search might be considered consen-
sual, since in her opinion the evidence was admissible anyway. That was because the evidence
obtained was real, and according to her understanding of Issacharov this in itself deemed it
admissible. Id. 20.
223. Id. 23.
224. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 45, at 235; WAYNE LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 309, 537-539 (4th ed. 2004).
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inherent powers doctrine: 225 since the police are charged with main-
taining the peace, and considering that the authorities granted to them
by law seem insufficient to carry out their duty, they must be given
greater powers and latitude. That the police's authorities to approach
and search an individual are regulated by statute, and that the law's
requirements were not met were deemed all but irrelevant. Naor con-
strued Issacharov as a way for courts to sanction the police's disregard
for statutory restrictions when judges deem it expedient to have done
so. Such reasoning essentially reduces criminal procedure to a test of
reasonableness, with judges deciding subjectively on a case-by-case
basis.
F. The Trees and the Forest: General Trends in the Application of
Issacahrov
The focus of this Article has thus far been descriptive, concentrat-
ing primarily on the application of the exclusionary doctrine. I have
paid extensive attention to analyzing the rule's application out of the
conviction that firm data is an indispensible foundation for theoretical
and normative claims about what the law is and why it is so. We must
look not only at what courts say but primarily at what they do, and
evaluate the differences between the two. To that end, this section
focused on particular interpretations of sub-categories within the Is-
sacharov tests. I have pointed to aspects in Issacharov's application
that seem particularly problematic. In order to truly appreciate the
application of the exclusionary rule, however, I propose that we step
back from the individual points and look at the picture that emerges
in its entirety. Although judges pay lip-service when discussing the
exclusionary rule in virtually every case, courts seem to hold onto any
possible test in Issacharov to justify admission regardless of how evi-
dence is obtained. Throughout the study we have encountered ex-
treme judicial reticence to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, even
in instances of severe and inexcusable police violations of the law.
The exclusionary doctrine's application has been decidedly anti-
exclusionary in a number of ways. First, in applying the rule, courts
attribute a prominent role to some of Issacharov's heavily criticized
tests, like the physicality of the evidence. Second, even tests whose
225. See ITZHAK ZAMIR, 1 THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY, 53 (1996). Zamir criticizes
the inherent powers doctrine and points to its inconsistency with the principle of administrative
legality. Id. The tension between inherent powers and administrative legality becomes even
more pronounced in the police's exercise of search, interrogation and detention powers, which
infringe upon basic rights. Therefore, introducing such reasoning into criminal procedure is par-
ticularly troubling.
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fate Issacharov left inconclusive-such as the severity of the crime-
have been embraced with only few qualms in later decisions. The def-
inition of what constitutes a severe crime has itself proved flexible and
over-inclusive. Third, tests that were left vague and ambiguous, such
as police's requisite state of mind or the necessary causal link between
the violation and the evidence obtained, have been interpreted almost
invariably in a manner that favors admission. Judges have insisted on
the strictest of causal relations, employing questionable counterfactual
analysis and dubious presumptions about what the defendant knew or
should have known. Conversely, anything less than malice on the po-
lice's part has been treated as a consideration that supports admission.
Finally, issues that seemed settled by law or were clearly laid down in
Issacharov have been rehashed and revised: doubts have been cast as
to the doctrine's applicability to pending proceedings and the police's
claimed ignorance of the law has weighed against exclusion more fre-
quently than not.
IV. THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND THE ISRAELI EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
This final section aims at situating the exclusionary rule within its
broader social, political and judicial context. Though a comprehen-
sive analysis of the causes for the exclusionary rule's weak application
will require separate treatment, I would like to briefly address some of
the issues that bear on the rule's interpretation. I believe that placing
the exclusionary doctrine within this broader context will provide a
more satisfying understanding of its limited application.
At different points throughout my analysis I have alluded to the
security agenda's possible influence on the exclusionary doctrine's
framing and implementation. I shall address this topic in greater de-
tail in this section. In previous work I have also argued that Is-
sacharov is best understood against the background of Israel's
dismissal of admissibility rules as overly rigid and formalistic. In this
section I will relate the erosion of admissibility rules, and the pursuant
shift towards more flexible standards, to more general approaches to-
wards procedural justice that bear on the exclusionary debate. Evalu-
ating the broader Israeli discourse concerning procedural justice will
also highlight potential differences between Israel and the United
States, and how these may have affected the form that the exclusion-
ary rule has taken, and might take in the future, in both countries. I
will also try to reconcile what appears as judicial disregard for proce-
dure and deference towards the government with the Israeli Supreme
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Court's image as activist. Finally, I will assess some of the costs and
benefits of Israel's flexible exclusionary rule.
A. The Limits of Doctrine as an Explanatory Factor
The first section of this article reviewed the literature concerning
Issacharov's doctrinal and structural shortcomings.226 Looking at
those critiques from a broader theoretical perspective, they can be
characterized as mostly internal to the exclusionary rule. They seem
to suggest that if only the Israeli Supreme Court had applied more
rigorous logic, or learned properly from other countries, it could have
"gotten it right," thus providing Israel with a better exclusionary rule.
Such an approach suggests that the reason for the rule's problematic
outcomes is incorrect or incoherent doctrine, which bred feeble
application.
Although Issacharov's internal and doctrinal flaws may account
for some of the problems in the rule's application, such explanations
are not entirely satisfactory; nor are accounts that tie the rule's weak
application to its underlying rationale, which emphasized judicial in-
tegrity rather than deterrence.227 Though doctrinal flaws may provide
226. For example, the Supreme Court did not prioritize between the various prongs of its
multi-faceted test-thus creating a vague standard rather than a bright-line rule; it erroneously
categorized or misinterpreted tests borrowed from foreign jurisdictions, such as discoverability
and conscription; and it included factors that should have been rendered irrelevant to the exclu-
sionary rule, such as the reliability of the evidence and the severity of the crime.
227. I refer here to an ongoing discussion throughout the October 2009 symposium entitled
"The Future of the Exclusionary Rule" at Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles, California.
Considerable attention was given to the exclusionary doctrine's goals and rationales, and their
possible effects on the rule's application. Some participants expressed skepticism about the
"majestic idea" expressed by Justice Holmes in Olmstead, by Justice Brennan's in Leon, and
finally by Justice Ginsburg in Herring, that exclusion should aim at least in part at preserving the
integrity of the legal process. It was suggested that such lofty ideals may reflect glorious princi-
ples, but that these might prove insufficiently pragmatic because they provide little guidance to
lower courts trying to decide how to rule in a particular case. It was also suggested that deter-
rence could more readily and effectively be broken down into actionable items. See Professor
David A. Sklansky, Symposium, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule: American and Interna-
tional Perspectives (Oct. 9, 2009), at 54-56 (unpublished transcript on file with SW. J. INT'L L.).
Compare Professor Andrew E. Taslitz, id. at 141-42. Professor Skalnsky's observations seems to
be supported by the fact that foreign courts that have focused on exclusion as a matter of proce-
dural rights, rather than treating it as a windfall to defendants from judicial attempts at deter-
rence, ironically tend to less readily exclude evidence. Perhaps surprisingly, it is the United
States that has become increasingly focused on deterrence-a more utilitarian than deontologi-
cal consideration-that nevertheless excludes more readily than any other country. Still, some
at the Symposium also expressed skepticism about the actual effect of deterrence as a rationale
for exclusion. Professor Ellen Podgor stated that she sees deterrence "as just a faqade" and that
"if deterrence really matters, it's going to have to get to that point where we are back to a state
of Mapp." ld. at 54.
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a partial explanation, they leave some phenomena entirely unac-
counted for. In particular, they fail to explain the stretching of Is-
sacharov's tests beyond their foreseeable limits and judicial revision of
well-established legal doctrines.228 Issacharov's elastic boundaries may
have made it easier for courts to bypass the exclusionary rule, but are
not themselves the reasons for circumvention.
To explain these phenomena I believe we must look outside Is-
sacharov and beyond the exclusionary rule itself, treating decisions
like Issacharov not as causes but as effects, as dependent rather than
independent variables. To focus criticism on Issacharov's tests is to
address the symptoms rather than the root-causes of judicial anti-ex-
clusionary policy. Understanding Issacharov and its progeny requires
placing them within their broader social and political context, as well
as within Israeli legal culture.
My proposed approach towards the exclusionary rule, and to-
wards legal doctrine more generally, questions the possibility of trans-
planting the Canadian formula for exclusion and expecting it to yield
similar results in Israel.229 Although at inception Issacharov may have
displayed strong resemblances to the Canadian Supreme Court deci-
sion in Collins, under the Israeli legal climate it seems to have lost
most of its affinity to its Canadian ancestor. I believe that these dif-
ferences do not stem solely from doctrinal flaws. Issacharov could not
have matured in isolation of its broader social and legal environment.
It appears that legal transplants rarely truly can.
B. The Exclusionary Rule and the Security Agenda
In Section II we discussed the cleansing effect that necessity
sometimes bestows upon unlawfully obtained evidence. It is perhaps
not surprising that this approach developed in national security cases
where civilian courts were asked to consider evidence obtained for
preventative purposes. Such cases reflect a fundamental dilemma fac-
ing the Israeli legal system and touch on a broader debate, in Israel
and elsewhere: how must democratic societies address terrorism. One
aspect of this debate is the controversy over the proper venue for try-
ing terror suspects.
228. See supra note 226-28 and accompanying text.
229. As Don Stuart illustrates in his article, Canadian courts appear to be shifting towards a
model that emphasizes the seriousness of the violation over all other considerations, thus expres-
sing an approach focused more closely on procedural justice. See Stuart, supra note 41. In con-
trast, Israeli courts using mostly the same list of considerations have taken an entirely different
tack.
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The debate over the proper venue for prosecuting terrorists is
often framed as one between civil liberties advocates, who believe that
alleged terrorists must be granted the same procedural rights as crimi-
nal defendants, and those who believe that a different set of norms
and institutions should govern such cases. 230 The latter often claim
that civilian courts are ill equipped to address the complex challenges
of terrorism, often citing overly restrictive and unsuitable rules of evi-
dence and criminal procedure.23a Supporters of trials in civilian courts
frequently retort by demonstrating how existing criminal procedure
doctrines can and have been used effectively to address terrorism
while ensuring fair trials.23
2
Taken together, Smirk and Salah highlight a slightly different di-
mension of this issue. Smirk begs the question whether procedural
safeguards will remain fixed and endure or whether standards might
instead be bent or redefined to secure the conviction of alleged ter-
rorists. Civilian courts may very well afford stronger procedural safe-
guards than do other fora. Still, Smirk points to potential unintended
consequences of trying terrorists in civilian courts. Anti-exclusionary
tendencies, which highlight the risk of guilty and potentially danger-
ous criminals going free, become further pronounced and more com-
pelling in the prosecution of terrorists. Courts may be under
considerable pressure and temptation to convict terror suspects, deter-
mining the lawfulness of investigation methods based on the centrality
of the tainted evidence. Even well-intentioned judges might fear that
their exclusion of crucial evidence will weigh towards holding terror-
230. See Robert S. Litt & Wells C. Bennett, Better Rules for Terrorism Trials 2 (The Series on
Counterterrorism and American Statutory Law, a joint project of the Brookings Institution, the
Georgetown University Law Center, and the Hoover Institution, Working Paper No. 7, 2009),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0508-terrorism-littbennett.aspx. The au-
thors also discuss a third side of this debate, which proposes national security courts with special
rules of procedure. See also The Best Way to Try Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, available
at http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/the-best-way-to-prosecute-terrorists/.
231. See, e.g., Victoria Toensing, The Case for Military Tribunals, THE WEEKLY STANDARD,
Feb. 1, 2010; see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Dec. 3, 2001.
232. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUT-
ING TERRORISM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 107 (2008); RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJA-
MIN, JR. IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 49 (2009
UPDATE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS): "in the past year, while new systems have failed and
new "fixes" have been floated, the criminal justice system has continued to build on its long
record of being an effective and fair tool for incapacitating terrorists. The evidence collected in
this 2009 Report confirms what was demonstrated in In Pursuit of Justice; that is, that the justice
system, while not perfect, continues to adapt to handle all manner of terrorism prosecutions
without sacrificing our national security interests or our commitment to fairness and due process
for all." Id.
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ism trials at other venues, which provide weaker procedural safe-
guards. To demonstrate their aptitude for addressing terrorism, such
judges might render existing procedures more pliable. Exigency, for
example, might be taken a step further.
Salah suggests yet another possible danger: doctrines developed
and applied in cases like Smirk, which might appear sound in the
counterterrorism context, do not necessarily remain confined within
that sphere. Evidence from Israel,233 as well as from the United King-
dom and the United States,234 suggests that once extraordinary
counterterrorism measures are implemented, introducing them into
the ordinary criminal context becomes more acceptable, creating a
spiral effect. 235  As particularly hard cases, terrorism trials perhaps
possess a unique potential of generating bad law.
To address both this spiral effect and the obstacles that regular
criminal procedure poses, some in Israel have supported the adoption
of a separate code the would apply in national security cases brought
before civilian courts.236 Such a "Terror Law" would, for example,
relax existing restrictions on the admissibility of hearsay evidence and
allow less rigorous and frequent judicial oversight of terrorists' deten-
tion.237 Containing such provisions within a separate code rather than
intertwining them in ordinary legislation, so the argument goes, would
limit their corrupting potential. Setting aside the moral and constitu-
tional concerns that such provisions still pose, it is doubtful whether
such a separate code would successfully contain their negative impact.
233. THE ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE, THE BATTLE OF THE 21ST CENTURY: DEMOC-
RACY FIGHTING TERROR DISCUSSION FORUM 103, 433 (2006), available at http://www.idi.org.il/
PublicationsCatalog/Pages/BOOK_7056/PublicationsCatalog_7056.aspx. For example, then Is-
raeli Minister of Internal Security suggested that prominent figures in Israeli organized crime be
subject to administrative arrests. Id. at 103. Similarly, then Deputy State Attorney Nava Ben-
Or stated that the Attorney General's Office opposed recognition of a defendant's right to have
an attorney present at his interrogation for fear that similar privileges might be afforded to
terror suspects. Id. at 80. This suggests that the Israeli Attorney General's office is well aware of
the mutual effects between the two kinds of trials, and appears to frame its policies accordingly.
The result is troublesome: the denial of rights to which criminal defendants would otherwise be
entitled. Ben-Or seemed genuinely unsettled by this state of affairs, and the fact that ordinary
criminals are forced to bear the brunt of an Attorney General operating under a terrorism para-
digm. Id. at 433.
234. See LAURA DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS AND LiB-
ERTY 15-16, 350 (2008).
235. Id. at 15. The process also seems to work in the reverse: a legal system might refrain
from granting certain procedural safeguards to criminal defendants for fear that these might
pose obstacles when investigating terror. This has been the case in Israel. See id.
236. DONOHUE, supra note 234, at 15-16.
237. Id. at 101, 113.
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As Laura Donohue has convincingly demonstrated, there is ample ev-
idence to suggest the contrary.238
Fully engaging this complicated and nuanced issue would go be-
yond the scope of this article. Still, cases like Smirk and Salah should
at least give pause to consider the possible costs that trying terrorists
in regular criminal courts might exact on the civil liberties of criminal
defendants. Pointing out such costs is not meant to imply that terror
suspects should not be tried in civilian courts. Rather, drawing aware-
ness to the potential risks emphasizes the vigilance terrorism cases re-
quire, lest procedures be tailored to secure certain outcomes and
cause undesirable side effects.
The security agenda might inform social realities, legal
frameworks and judicial perceptions in additional ways. National se-
curity threats often provide the impetus for bestowing preventative
powers upon the police; they may also inform judicial interpretations
of those powers. This might explain the doubts that Israeli judges
have expressed as to whether asking an individual to empty his pock-
ets constitutes a "search." In a country where individuals routinely
surrender their person and belongings to searches when entering
malls, supermarkets and cafes, a policeman's request to empty one's
pockets seems like an intrusion hardly worth fussing about. Security
threats may also provide context for the criminalization of certain be-
haviors that would otherwise be considered "mere preparation," in
particular the creation, enforcement and severe punishment of simple
possession crimes.239 They may also explain judicial displays of trust
towards law enforcement agents even when the police violate the law:
throughout the study we have seen judges portray the police's claimed
238. Donohue, supra note 234, at 15-16. Donohue outlines two ways in which counterterror-
ism measures creep into the non-terror context: in the first scenario, legislators are diligent in
limiting the powers to counterterrorism, "but once such measures are implemented, the idea of
using them is not longer extraordinary. . . . Subsequent laws may thus explicitly transfer
counterterrorist authorities to ordinary criminal law." Id. at 15. The second mechanism stems
from lack of specificity in legislation granting the counterterrorism powers. Id. at 16. It seems
that the former scenario best addresses the danger of the proposed "Terror Law."
239. I refer here in particular to knife possession, which has figured prominently in motions
to suppress. True, scholars have shown that the increase in possession crimes at least in the
United States predates 9/11, and is independent of the security agenda. See generally, Markus
Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829 (2001); Markus Dirk Dubber, The War on Terror and U.S. Criminal Law
(University of Toronto Working Paper Series, Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1521252. Still, the fight against terror no doubt offers additional compelling justifications
for adding and vigorously enforcing such crimes. Though terror may not be the sine qua non for
the increased criminalization of such possession crimes, it may still have provided the impetus
the and the cloak for their expansion.
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ignorance of the law and unlawful search of recidivists as acts con-
ducted in good faith.
The foregoing observations suggest that in the fight against terror
Israeli courts may have grown accustomed to an increasingly prevent-
ative model. That, in turn, may have affected the manner in which
judges perceive police powers more broadly. It is against this back-
ground that we must assess the seeming deference that courts display
towards police violations when applying-or more precisely, when not
applying-the exclusionary rule.
C. Procedural Justice in the Israeli Legal System
1. From Rigid Formalism to Substantive Justice: The Shift
from Admissibility to Weight
To more fully appreciate judicial attitudes towards the exclusion-
ary doctrine we must consider the broader discourse in Israel sur-
rounding evidentiary rules. Since the 1980s24 ° Israeli courts have
consciously and deliberately moved away from rules of admissibility
towards more flexible standards of weight.24 Rules of admissibility
have been repeatedly portrayed as conceptually alien to the Israeli
legal system and culture: a colonial legacy,242 they were devised pri-
marily for juries, to shelter lay fact-finders from unreliable informa-
240. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] 48, reprinted in
2006(1) Isr. L. Rep. 320, 392-93. Arguably, this trend was evident much earlier, perhaps as early
as soon after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. See, e.g., CrimA 20/49 Hadi v. Att'y
Gen. [1949] IsrSC 3(1) 13.
241. See Emanuel Gross, Should Israel Adopt a Constitutional Exclusionary Rule? 30
MISHPATIM (HEBREW U. L. REv.) 145,149 (1998).
242. The rules' British colonial origin may go some way in explaining the legal system's am-
bivalence towards them, which may suggest a post-colonial element to this issue. Perhaps ironi-
cally, Israel's colonial British past may have made it more difficult to fully embrace the
exclusionary rule. Whereas one would assume that Israel's common law legacy would make it
easier to introduce an exclusionary rule, experience suggests the contrary. Israel complexes with
rules of admissibility do not seem to manifest themselves in quite the same fashion in civil law
jurisdictions. As Stefano Maffei's paper suggests, it would appear that the European Court of
Human Rights might even be on a path towards adopting the American Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree doctrine, which Israeli courts have so adamantly rejected. Stefano Maffei, The Cloak of the
Law: Fruit Falling from the Poisonous Tree, Gafgen v. Germany: a European Perspective on the
Exclusionary Rule, Working Paper (Sw J. INT'L L. 2009 Symposium, unpublished transcript on
file). This might be because European nations do not share Israel's past with the common law
and its complex struggle with rules of admissibility throughout the decades. Like a rebellious
teenager, Israel's jurisprudence has oscillated between a sense of pride and admiration towards
its common law ancestor and a sense of belonging to that imagined community of nations, and
an attempt to assert its own identity and pave its own way. See also Likhovski, supra note 62.
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tion that would unfairly bias their decisions.243 In Israel's juryless
system these rigid rules have been blamed for forcing professional
judges to disregard relevant and reliable evidence and ignore what
they know to be the truth.244 Some have suggested that the adver-
sarial model more generally, which frames the criminal trial as a con-
test or struggle, is ill-suited for uncovering the truth, and thus prevents
judges from doing justice.2 45 Israel's conscious move from admissibil-
ity rules towards more flexible standards of evidentiary weight has
been tied to a broader shift from legal formalism towards discretion
that expresses substantive justice.246 Expressing a variant on Jeremy
Bentham's maxim, in Israel the exclusion of evidence has been
equated with exclusion of justice.
The casualties of the shift from admissibility to weight have not
only been reliability-based evidentiary rules. Public-policy based doc-
trines, such as the exclusionary rule, have also fallen victim to this
attitude.247 Though concerned primarily with defendant's rights and
procedural fairness, not reliability, the exclusionary rule has been stig-
243. See, e.g., CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov [2006] 40; DN 23/85 State of Israel v. Tubul [1988]
23; HCJ 6319/95 Hahmi v. Tel Aviv Magistrate [1997] IsrSC 51(3) 750, 760-761, 5-8.
244. See, e.g., Uri Struzman, The Naked King or the Dominance of Juries in Israeli Courts, 13
TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 175 (1988). Struzman, a judge at the Tel Aviv District Court, describes
how admissibility rules often lead to the acquittal of defendants known to be guilty. He writes
how "once again the rules of evidence have defeated the pursuit of justice." Id. at 178.
Struzman then wonders why "there is still a sacredness about laws imported from a foreign land"
and asks why "the dust is not removed from these principles.., to determine whether their
[foundations] are solid or whether they have grown unstable when moved from their native
England [to Israel]. Id. Struzman makes a series of recommendations for reform concerning,
for example, out-of-court statements and the admissibility of accomplice testimony.
245. See Mordechai Kremnitzer, Rethinking Criminal Process, 17 MISHPATiM, 475, 477
(1987). The literal translation of the Hebrew title of the article is far more suggestive: "Making
Criminal Process Conform to the Goal of Uncovering the Truth, Or Is It Not Yet Time to End
the Game Season?"
246. See CrimA 5614/92 State of Israel v. Messika [1995] IsrSC 49(2), 669, 680-81. This ap-
proach is also evident in Justice Cheshin's separate opinion in Issacharov, that commends Justice
Beinisch for looking beyond the rigid rules of evidence that formed during the course of history
to make the judge's craft more manageable; she instead focused on the purpose of these rules
and the "spirit of the times." See Issacharov 91 6 (Cheshin, J., concurring).
247. This discourse infiltrated the exclusionary rule debate despite the important differences
between the two kinds of admissibility: exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, as a legal ques-
tion, is independent of the reliability of the evidence; it had to do with the rights of the defen-
dant. See Andrew Choo & Susan Nash, Improperly Obtained Evidence in the Commonwealth:
Lessons for England and Wales, 11 INT'L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 77 (2007). In fact, some
scholars have argued that the exclusionary rule has been improperly categorized as a rule of
evidence, even though its "design and operation are evidence-related," since exclusion is moti-
vated by social goals that are not aimed solely at fact-finding. See STEIN, supra note 71, at 27.
Therefore, despite the absence of juries, the decision of an Israeli judge to exclude illegally ob-
tained evidence would be no different from that of a judge in any other common law jurisdiction.
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matized by exclusion's image as inappropriately rigid legal formal-
ism.
2 4 8
Even when introducing the exclusionary rule, the Israeli Supreme
Court associated the idea of exclusion with the old formalism and ri-
gidity - and ultimately with injustice. Justice Beinisch went to great
lengths to explain why Issacharov, which at first glance seems incon-
sistent with the Court's erosion of admissibility rules, was not a return
to the rigid approach of yesteryears.249 The Court did not resolve the
seeming contradiction by contrasting public-policy and reliability-
based rules. Rather, the Court explained that despite its appearance,
the exclusionary rule was still sufficiently flexible. Verdict accuracy
would continue to reign supreme, even in the application of this safe-
guard of procedural justice.25 ° At the end of Issacharov, Beinisch reit-
erated the presumption that relevant evidence is to remain
admissible.251 Therefore, it is no coincidence that reliability became a
dominant ingredient in Issacharov; this was not the result of the Court
misspeaking, or a misreading Canadian doctrine. 252 Nor is it surpris-
ing that reliability and the severity of the offense continue to play
prominent roles in the decisions of Israeli courts, loath to exclude rel-
evant and reliable evidence regardless of how it was obtained.
2. Relative Voidness and the Erosion of Procedural Justice in
Administrative Law
Portraying process as means rather than an independent end has
not been confined to evidentiary rules of admissibility or to criminal
248. For a more comprehensive analysis of this trend see Blum, supra note 17, at 2147. For
example, the relatively developed exclusionary rule for confessions under the British Mandate in
Palestine, which looked not only at the evidence's reliability but also at police's compliance with
the Judges' Rules, was abandoned as being excessively technical. See CrimA 20/49 Hadi v. Att'y
Gen. [1949] IsrSC 3(1) 13. The question of whether a confession should be deemed "free and
voluntary" under Article 12 of the Evidence Ordinance increasingly became a factual, rather
than normative one, concerned mainly with the statement's credibility. Rather than focusing on
the authorities' impropriety, the standard became whether the defendant's free will had been
broken and whether under such circumstances an innocent person may have confessed to a
crime they did not commit. See CrimA 115/82 Muadi v. State of Israel [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 197.
249. Issacharov was instead portrayed as "an additional development founded upon the dy-
namic processes already underway in evidence law." See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief
Military Prosecutor [2006] 48, reprinted in 2006(1) Isr. L. Rep. 320, 392-93.
250. Id. The Court emphasized its continued commitment to "uncovering the truth" as para-
mount. Hence, Justice Beinisch rejected the "rigid" American model in favor of more flexible
models found in other common law jurisdictions. Id.
251. Id. at $ 63, 76, at 414-15, 429.
252. And, therefore, no coincidence that the distinction between physical and testimonial
evidence is part of this prong.
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procedure.253 This approach is also evident in Israeli administrative
law, where since the early 1980s the "relative voidness" doctrine has
been steadily gaining ground, parallel to the erosion of admissibility
rules. Relative voidness has enabled the Court to validate acts and
decisions reached in violation of administrative law, which under the
traditional approach would have been deemed null and void.255
From a narrow doctrine applied sparingly to give legal effect to
marginal breaches or to voidable acts of governmental agencies, the
Supreme Court has increasingly used relative voidness to resuscitate
void acts. The Court has done so even when administrative decisions
were reached ultra vires256 or in violation of fundamental principles of
natural justice, such as the right to a hearing.257 At first the Court
took this ends-oriented approach when validating an otherwise void
act was crucial to protect individuals who acted in good faith or in
reliance upon it.258 But the doctrine soon expanded; it was increas-
ingly used to give general effect to decisions reached in violation of
administrative law.259 More importantly for our purposes, the doc-
trine has often been invoked against individuals and in favor of the
government, rather than the other way around.260
253. See Daphne Barak-Erez, Relative Voidness in Administrative Law: On the Price of
Rights, in ITZHAK ZAMIR BOOK: ON LAW, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 284-85, n.6 (Ariel
Bendor & Yoav Dotan eds., 2005). Barak-Erez shows how the doctrine idea of relative voidness
is applied to legal fields from contracts to labor law, but though primarily in the sphere public
law.
254. Id. at 294.
255. Traditional Israeli administrative law (following the English lead) distinguished between
void and voidable acts. Id. at 287.
256. Id. at 304.
257. Id. at 312. Relative voidness can be understood as an attempt by the Supreme Court to
separate "conduct" rules from "decision" rules. For a discussion of the distinction between the
two see generally, Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
258. Barak-Erez, supra note 253, at 295-96.
259. Initially the act was validated for a particular proceeding or towards a particular party,
against whom it would be unfair to deem it void. Id. at 297.
260. See id. at 308-09. A case in point, which is particularly relevant to our discussion of
procedural justice, was HCJ 118/80 Greenstein v. Chief Military Prosecutor [1980] IsrSC 35(1)
239. The petitioner, an IDF soldier, was not given proper access to the Military Police file that
his commander had consulted before disciplinary proceedings were brought against him. Id.
The Supreme Court denied the soldier's petition to pronounce the proceedings null and void.
Id. at 247. The Court reasoned that nondisclosure of the file did not compromise the soldier's
defense or "lead to a miscarriage of justice." Id. Bakke expounded upon this approach. See
Barak-Erez, supra note 253, at 300. There Justice Zamir addressed the ramifications of the au-
thority's failure to conduct a hearing although obligated by law to do so:
A decision reached in the absence of a hearing may remain valid if after the fact it
becomes evident that there would have been no use in the hearing, meaning that there
were no valid arguments to be made.... We must distinguish well between the rule that
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The relative voidness doctrine can be directly linked to the exclu-
sionary rule. Both are outcome driven. Focusing on the merits, both
ask whether the result may or should have been different, which
trumps most procedural flaws.261 In Issacharov Justice Beinisch, and
to a greater extent Justice Cheshin, 62 drew an explicit analogy be-
tween the two doctrines. But in doing so, they imported an already
controversial doctrine of administrative law into the criminal context,
where it becomes only more problematic. If the relative voidness ap-
proach is to prevail in the application and understanding of Is-
sacharov, little will be left of the exclusionary rule. After all, the
evidence excluded is typically reliable; ergo, the accurate and there-
fore just result is typically conviction.
The Israeli approach towards procedure, as manifested in both
the relative voidness doctrine and the exclusionary rule, reflects a cer-
tain understanding of what lends legitimacy to the state's exercise of
authority. This approach corresponds quite neatly with Mirjan
Dama~ka's characterization of procedure in the "activist state." '263 He
binds the administrative authority, and the remedy prescribed by courts for breach of
that rule. The rule operates in one dimension, whereas the remedy acts in another.
The court may consider, after the fact, factors that differ from those that bound the
authority ex-ante.
Both Greenstein and Bakke emphasize that the crux of an injustice is the outcome it produces.
Again, we see that procedural justice-and the rights it entails-are subordinated to the accu-
racy of the result.
261. Id. at 297-98, citing in particular HCJ 598/77 Deri v. Parole Commission [1978] IsrSC
32(3) 161, which formed the foundation for this approach: Justice Kahan in his separate opinion
noted that the although the parolee's right to a hearing had been breached, in reality he had no
good claim to make. Therefore, the voidness of the decision was relative. This reasoning is
strikingly similar to that applied in Belfer, discussed on page 134. There too, the violation of the
defendant's right to an attorney was not considered sufficient to justify exclusion of her state-
ment because it did not affect her defense.
262. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] IsrSC 2006(1) 70. Jus-
tice Cheshin is more explicit on this matter. See id. 5 (Cheshin, J., concurring). See also Justice
Hayut's opinion in Elzam. CrimA 1301/06 Estate of Elzam v. State of Israel [2009] 2
(unpublished).
263. Damagka distinguishes between two state models-activist and reactive-and the jus-
tice systems they adopt. Reactive states are "limited to providing a supporting framework" to
their citizens. Id. at 73. The state refuses to embrace an independent theory of what is good for
society and displays no inherent interests or problems separate from those of society. Such a
state's legal system is geared primarily towards dispute resolution in cases where citizens choose
to engage the system. Its procedural rules are crafted to maintain the fairness of the contest,
upon which the legitimacy of the outcome-and the legal system more broadly-ultimately rest.
In contrast, the activist state "strives towards a comprehensive theory of the good life and tries
to use it as a basis for a conceptually all-encompassing program of material and moral better-
ment of its citizens." Id. at 80. Such states typically treat civil society with suspicion; "society is
defective and in need of improvement." Perhaps more importantly for the case of Israel, such
states place "a strong emphasis on a shared sense of citizenship" and "the government regards
itself not as a neutral conflict resolver but rather as a manager of joint pursuit." Id. at 81. The
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explains that whereas reactive states, such as the United States, justify
judicial decisions:
more in terms of fairness of procedures employed than the accuracy
of results obtained... procedural rules in the activist state occupy a
much less important and independent position: procedure is basi-
cally a handmaiden of substantive law... decisions are legitimated
primarily in terms of the correct outcomes they embody. A proper
procedure is one that increases the probability-or maximizes the
likelihood-of achieving a substantively accurate result rather than
one that successfully effects notions of fairness or protects some col-
lateral substantive value.., procedural law is doubly derivative: like
art in Plotinus' vision, it can be likened to a shadow of a shadow.264
In such a state, "sacrifice of substantive accuracy for the sake of
procedural regularity remains a somewhat embarrassing anomaly; it
smacks of the 'formalism' so alien to the ideology of the activist state,
and so, in most instances, procedural regulation remains pliable. 265
It is precisely this procedural pliability and aversion to formalism that
we encounter in Israel's relative voidness doctrine and in the erosion
of admissibility rules. This approach also helps contextualize the Is-
raeli application of the exclusionary rule, which seems to only inter-
fere with accurate outcomes.
Israel's outcome-driven approach towards process appears in
sharp contrast to the image of procedural justice in the United States.
For that reason, predictions that the American exclusionary rule will
remain "significantly stronger than its overseas analog[s]" seem accu-
rate.266 Still, we must not overstate the differences in the exclusionary
rule's application in both countries. As Carol Steiker has demon-
strated in her analysis of criminal procedure developments since the
Warren Court, the United States Supreme Court has increasingly be-
law in such a state is aimed towards achieving state goals and is malleable towards achieving
those objectives. Rights are not treated as entitlements: "No right is absolute or abstract, in the
sense that its exercise can be abstracted from its broader impact. . . because the policies and
programs of the activist state are theoretically all encompassing, broader implications can be
detected anywhere: all rights are at least potentially subject to qualification or denial." Id. at 83.
This last observation may evoke memories from the Israeli Supreme Court's holding in Is-
sacharov itself, where the Court stated that the right to due process, "like all rights recognized in
our legal system .. .is not absolute," CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor
[2006] 68. Due process is subject to balancing with other competing interests and values such
as rectitude of decision and crime control.
264. DAMASKA, supra note 18, at 148.
265. Id. at 152.
266. See David A. Sklansky, Symposium, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule: American and
International Perspectives (Oct. 9, 2009) at 54 (unpublished transcript on file with SW. J. INr'L
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come "less sympathetic to claims of individual rights and more accom-
modating to assertions of the need for public order. '2 67 While the
norms governing police activity have remained relatively unchanged,
the development and expansion of "inclusionary rules" has fundamen-
tally altered the consequences of violating those norms.2 68 In this re-
spect, both the United States and Israel reflect a similar approach that
separates violations from their consequences.
3. Activist States and Activist Courts
The foregoing analysis of procedural justice in Israel begs the
question why the Israeli Supreme Court would create an exclusionary
rule in the first place. Furthermore, the Israeli exclusionary rule and
the relative voidness doctrine both seem highly deferential towards
the executive, which appears inconsistent with the Israeli Supreme
Court's frequent portrayal as highly activist. Though seemingly unre-
lated, both point to the same answer: what at first blush appears as
deference to government and state authority becomes slightly more
complicated upon closer examination. Though less overt than striking
down laws, creating an exclusionary rule but rarely applying it perhaps
embodies a more subtle form of judicial activism. As Barak-Erez
points out, relative voidness is perhaps the essence of judicial activism
albeit in a sheep's skin. 26 9 Focus on the outcome and its desirability,
rather than on the legitimacy of the process, enhances judicial discre-
tion and activism even though it may ultimately result in fewer in-
stances of judicial intervention. But the insistence on procedural
niceties becomes the preference of the individual judge, based on her
subjective view of the optimal result. Judges can be stricter on proce-
dure if they disapprove of the outcome, but otherwise declare the re-
sult only relatively void. In principle, adopting an exclusionary rule
would seem like a reversal of this trend, imposing some restrictions on
outcome-based evaluations. In practice, however, we have seen that
the doctrine's flexibility has only provided an additional tool for re-
267. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2468 (1996).
268. Id. at 2504. Drawing on the work of Dan-Cohen, Steiker distinguishes between changes
in the Court's conduct rules and its decision rules. She notes that the main innovations intro-
duced by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were in the consequences of Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendment violations. The two main manifestations are the application of the exclusionary
rule and appellate review of decisions in which unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admit-
ted. Id. 2504-05. In the application of the exclusionary rule, Steiker points out changes in the
doctrines of standing, good faith, fruits or the poisonous tree and impeachment. Id. at 2521,
2523.
269. Barak-Erez, supra note 253, at 317.
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versing results that judges find substantively objectionable, or for
making a rhetorical point where the costs of exclusion are low.
4. The Power to Exclude and Judicial Oversight
The form that the exclusionary rule has taken also embodies a
particular approach towards judicial oversight, one that keeps the ex-
ecutive in check while allowing it the flexibility to be effective. 270 By
creating a highly elastic exclusionary doctrine, Israeli courts have re-
fused to communicate clear ex-ante guidelines regarding when and
how the police might be able to break the law and still get away with
it. The police are to operate under the looming threat that what they
do might be deemed unlawful, the evidence they acquire excluded,
and in extreme cases, their violations prosecuted. Such an approach
might aim at ensuring that the police do not rely on the fact that the
court will admit the evidence and overlook their transgressions. As a
result, the police are perhaps less likely to violate the law unless doing
so is truly necessary. 27 1 And although the Court asserted that deter-
rence was not its primary aim, such an unpredictable model may in
270. The Supreme Court has employed a similar approach towards checking executive power
while still allowing authorities enough flexibility to be effective. See for example HCJ 5100/94
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel IsrSC 53(4), 817, [1999], in particular J$ 36, 38-39,
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/verdictssearch/englishverdictssearch.aspx. Such a model
may be particularly attractive for addressing issues of national security, as demonstrated by a
recent decision: in February 2010, the Israeli Supreme Court struck down a law that allowed in
absentia detention hearings for those suspected of security offenses. See CHR 8823/07 Anony-
mous v. State of Israel [2010 1 34-35 (unpublished). The Court struck down the law as unconsti-
tutional at a time when the Court's authority to do so was already under considerable attack,
with the Knesset considering a number of proposals that would limit that power. Striking down
the law only added fuel to an already high flame, making the Court seem overly activist. Though
undoubtedly a bold move on the Court's part, Chief Justice Beinisch sowed the seeds of the
Court's power to declare exceptions within the decision to strike down the law. In her concur-
ring judgment, Beinisch wrote that the Court might still allow in absentia hearings in cases of the
proverbial "ticking bomb." Id. (Beinisch, C.J., concurring). In so ruling, the Court expressed its
distaste for overly broad legislation that provides the executive a wide ex-ante safety net to rely
on when curtailing the fundamental rights of security-offense suspects. At the same time the
Chief Justice maintained the Court's ability ex-post to declare the exception. It is perhaps the
combination of striking down a law, while maintaining the power to declare the exceptions,
which only further contributes to the Court's image as activist.
271. For a similar argument concerning the defense of necessity in criminal law see Dan-
Cohen, supra note 257 at 637-38 (1984). "[T]he prospect of punishment (undiminished by the
availability of the defense [of necessity]) can be seen here to place an objectively determined
price tag on the option of violating the law. The willingness of the individual to pay the price of
his transgression lends credence to the claim of necessity by helping to assure the judge that the
evil averted by the transgression was compelling." Id.
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fact prove quite effective, while not entirely sacrificing crime control,
national security or accuracy of verdicts.2 72
However, to maintain the effectiveness of such checks, courts
must enforce the norms they proclaim at least occasionally, lest their
threats appear empty. Yet one inference we may draw from this re-
search is that Israeli courts are highly unlikely to release even a com-
mon criminal merely because the police or GSS blundered. Although
the decision will ultimately rest with the judiciary, courts are more
likely than not to defer to law enforcers' judgment. Had the police
been aware of Issacharov but ignorant of its weak application, the ex-
clusionary rule could have perhaps still served as an effective check
against police abuses. But the police will likely realize (if they have
not already) that the exclusionary rule is no more than a paper tiger.
Although after Issacharov the police appeared to be making a con-
scious effort to improve their compliance with the law,273 it is doubtful
whether such attempts will endure.
5. The Costs of a Flexible Exclusionary Standard
The foregoing analysis throws into sharp relief some of the costs
to judicial reputation and integrity that are, perhaps ironically, inher-
ent in creating a discretionary exclusionary rule. With the power to
exclude comes a responsibility to do so in certain cases. But by not
enforcing a power they now clearly possess, Israeli courts appear com-
plicit in police abuses in a way they previously were not. When they
admit evidence despite its unlawfulness, judges now seem to provide
their tacit approval to executive violations. Whereas in the past
judges could reprimanded the police and still admit the evidence, cit-
ing their lack of authority to exclude, they must now address the mer-
272. As David A. Sklansky explained, courts tend to prefer an ambiguous exclusionary rule
that will allow them on the one hand to deter and maintain judicial integrity, while allowing
them to admit evidence that will lead to the conviction of the guilty. Professor Sklansky aptly
compared this judicial tendency to that of a parent who wishes to teach their child not to rely on
the parent's willingness to bring the child's homework to school when they forget it, but still
wants the child to succeed and therefore delivers the homework anyway. Sklansky, supra note
227, at 178-79. While this metaphor seems to aptly capture many instances in which the court
disapproves of the police's behavior, it leaves out an important subset. As we have seen in the
case of terror investigations, authorities can sometimes point to a necessity that required them to
ignore the law, which further compounds a court's choice of what to do with the evidence. See
id.
273. See Crim (Jer.) 2647/06 State of Israel v. Badaria [2008] 17 (unpublished). See also
CrimA 9956/05 Shai v. State of Israel [2009], Berliner J. dissenting, 6 (unpblished). Judge
Berliner opined that the police's regard for the right to counsel increased considerably following
Issacharov. Id.
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its of each violation.274 When balancing costs and benefits, judges
must explain in every instance why, though obtained unlawfully, the
police's behavior does not require exclusion.
As we have seen throughout this research, whether courts like it
or not, every decision to admit unlawfully obtained evidence reads
like an apologia for the police's violation: good faith, necessity, pro-
portionality, crime control, national security. The intellectual sophis-
tication of relative voidness and the attempt to separate conduct rules
from decision rules thus turns out to be a double-edged sword.
Though the exclusionary doctrine may have seemed like a good way
for courts to scold authorities while approving the outcomes of their
actions, the judiciary's intended double message does not come
through. The most visible and lasting feature of dismissing motions to
exclude is not their rebuke of the police, that by now rings hollow, but
judges' justifications for the police's acts. The attempt to separate vio-
lation from outcome thus brings the judiciary into the arena every
time they opt to admit, denying it the luxury of being a spectator and
claiming that it is merely applying the law.
Yet another undesirable consequence of an unexercised exclu-
sionary power is its potentially lulling effect on Israeli civil society. As
long as no exclusionary rule existed in Israel, academics, defendants'
rights activists and NGOs had a clear target at which they could aim:
creating such a doctrine. But once the Supreme Court recognized
such a doctrine in principle in Issacharov, it provided a false hope that
from now on police abuses would bear consequences. In the process,
a uniting cause for activism was diffused. At least until the judiciary's
reticence to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence is widely studied
and understood by the Bar and the public, demands for exclusion will
be in the hands of defense lawyers pleading for their individual clients.
I hope this study will draw attention to the de facto absence of an
exclusionary rule and will help re-galvanize defendants rights' advo-
cates once again.
274. A similar argument has been voiced concerning the Supreme Court's generally in-
creased intervention in government decisions: when the Court chooses not to act it appears to be
approving of the executive's actions. See David Kretzmer, Forty Years of Public Law, 24 IsR. L.
Rav. 355. See also: RUTH GAVISON, MORDECHAI KREMNITZER & YOAV DOTAN, JUDICIAL Ac-
TIVISM: FOR AND AGAINST, THE ROLE OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN ISRAELI SOCIETY
115-17 (2000).
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite growing international consensus that criminal defendants
must be awarded due process, the precise definition and content of
this concept remains highly elusive and differs drastically from one
legal system to another. Systems also differ in the consequences they
attach to the state's failure to comply with the requirements of due
process laid down in its constitution, legislation, or judicial decisions.
That has been our focus in this article. In taking a stance on this issue,
legal systems fall somewhere along a broad spectrum as to what they
consider to be the primary aims of the exclusionary rule: deterrence,
the "protective principle," judicial integrity or judicial reputation.
When they recognize more than one goal, systems differ in how they
prioritize between the objectives, especially when the goals lead to
different outcomes. Legal systems also diverge on what they regard to
be relevant considerations in deciding whether to exclude and how
they weigh those factors against one another when they conflict.
I have argued that the exclusionary rule ultimately implicates a
deeper and more fundamental dilemma: under what circumstances, if
any, might a legal system deem it necessary in the interest of justice to
elevate due process (however defined) over accurate outcomes. This
dilemma reflects a legal system's approach towards procedural safe-
guards: are these merely the "handmaiden of substantive law '2 75 that
ensure accurate results and may therefore be overridden when they
interfere with that end? Or do procedural safeguards represent ends
in themselves that provide the foundation upon which judicial legiti-
macy ultimately rests? Obviously, these seemingly contrasting ap-
proaches are to some extent Weberian ideal types. Most legal systems
are hybrids. Still, these characterizations provide a useful prism for
analyzing the exclusionary rule and evaluating judicial approaches to-
wards justice more generally.
Legal systems do not address dilemmas on the proper scope of
due process or its balancing against other values and interests in the
abstract: they often shape their approaches incrementally in response
to concrete challenges. Nor do their positions on these questions re-
main static. Some have likened them to a pendulum or a spiral,276 with
275. DAMASKA, supra note 18, at 148.
276. For the pendulum analogy see M. Groenhuijsen, Illegally Obtained Evidence: An Analy-
sis of New Trends in the Criminal Justice System of the Netherlands, in THE XIIITH WORLD
CONGRESS ON PROCEDURAL LAW: THE BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPORT 112-13 (A.W. Jongbloed
ed., 2008). Laura Donohue has preferred to describe the effects of counterterrorism as a spiral
rather than a pendulum. The pattern she recognizes is that extraordinary powers awarded tem-
porarily have the tendency to become permanent. DONOHUE, supra note 234, at 15.
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particularly dramatic events-either domestic or international-pos-
sessing the power of significantly altering the center of gravity. Bal-
ances are highly contextual and embedded in experience, both
historical and present, rather than based on logic or first principles.
Furthermore, balances are not defined solely by the judiciary, but also
by its relations to other branches of government and towards society
more broadly. Such relations are themselves dynamic and may be
heavily swayed by events.
Judicial systems are often divided within themselves over the
proper balance between these competing ideals. Few judges whole-
heartedly embrace the frequent outcome of the exclusionary rule, the
release of a person who is held to be guilty and possibly dangerous.
Still fewer embrace such a result when the defendant is charged with
terrorist acts or other severe crimes. There is a natural discomfort in
acquitting a defendant just because "the constable had blundered."
But there is also uneasiness with a conviction founded on the state's
breach of the law, which implicates the integrity and moral standing of
the criminal legal system. That is precisely why even a century after
Weeks,27 7 and though many democracies have since adopted an exclu-
sionary rule of some scope, the doctrine remains so controversial.
That is also why it will likely be debated for many years to come.
Despite spiral effects and swings of the pendulum and notwith-
standing internal divisions, judicial systems can still be characterized
by where their center of gravity rests. In the case of Israel, we have
seen that Issacharov represented a conscious effort by the Supreme
Court-at least rhetorically-to shift the paradigm, taking procedural
rights more seriously. But in practice such a shift has not occurred, at
least not yet. This may have been evident in the Issacharov ruling
itself. But the absence of a paradigm shift has become further appar-
ent in the decisions that followed Issacharov, which remain highly fo-
cused on rectitude of decision regardless of the rights violated,
especially in the context of severe crimes and acts of terrorism.
Although the choice of outcomes over process is linked to
broader social and political realities, I do not suggest that the Israeli
legal system-or any legal system for that matter-must remain
trapped within its existing paradigm until a dramatic external change
of circumstances. Although dramatic events often sound the alarm
and present the strongest impetus to reconsider received wisdom,
change can be generated from within, as the Israeli Supreme Court
277. Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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has proved time and again. Judges can resolve to take procedural
safeguards more seriously despite the reality in which they operate, if
they genuinely believe that judicial integrity is compromised in their
admission of unlawfully obtained evidence. But to truly effect such
profound change, judges must be resolute and brave, and bold deci-
sions must be made. Alas, Issacharov and its progeny reflect no such
resolve.
